Vol. 42, no. 1: Full Issue by Center Journal, Denver Law
Denver Law Review 
Volume 42 Issue 1 Article 7 
1965 
Vol. 42, no. 1: Full Issue 
Denver Law Center Journal 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/dlr 
Recommended Citation 
42 Denv. L. Ctr. J. (1965). 
This Full Issue is brought to you for free and open access by the Denver Law Review at Digital Commons @ DU. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Denver Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more 















Fair Housing in Colorado
By MORTON GITELMAN*
The Colorado Fair Housing Act of 1959' was innovative in that
it was one of the first state statutes to generally forbid racial or
religious discrimination in private housing. The controversial nature
of the act was punctuated by legislative compromises and amendments
prior to passage and by a narrow margin of victory in the legislature.
By contrast, the 1965 amendments to the act were almost free of
crippling compromise and enjoyed a surprisingly large margin of
victory in the legislature.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the basic premises of
the 1959 act, the administrative and judicial developments under that
act, the background of the 1965 amendments, and a critique of the
problems solved and the problems created by those amendments.
I. THE 1959 ACT
The heart of any statute dealing with fair housing is that race,
color, religion, or ancestry should not be a factor in the transfer of
housing accommodations. As stated in the Colorado act:
(a) It shall be an unfair housing practice and unlawful and
hereby prohibited:
(b) For any person having the right of ownership, or posses-
sion, or the right of transfer, rental, or lease of any housing: To
refuse to transfer, rent, or lease, or otherwise to deny to or with-
hold from any person or persons such housing because of race,
creed, color, sex, national origin, or ancestry; to discriminate
against any person because of race, creed, color, sex, national origin,
or ancestry in the terms, conditions, or privileges pertaining to any
housing, or the transfer, rental, or lease thereof, or in the furnish-
ing of facilities or services in connection therewith; or cause to
be made any written or oral inquiry or record concerning the race,
creed, color, sex, national origin, or ancestry of a person seeking
to purchase, rent, or lease any housing.
2
The idea that the state can regulate the racial or religious factor
in the decision of one having control of housing was unquestioned
so long as a connection between the state and the housing was
established. Thus statutes dealing with discrimination in publicly-
assisted housing do not create much controversy because of the
aphorism that the hand that pays the piper calls the tune. When,
however, the state regulates purely private residential property,
*Associate Professor of Law, University of Arkansas. Formerly Associate Professor of
Law, University of Denver; member, Governor's Fair Housing Study Committee
(Colo.).
'COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 69-7-1 to 7 (1963).
2 COLo. REv. STAT. § 69-7-5 (1)(a), (b) (1963).
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controversy is inevitable. Thus, a great public debate centered around
the coverage provision of the Colorado Act:
"Housing" shall mean any building, structure, or part thereof
which is used or occupied, or is intended, arranged or designed to
be used or occupied as the home or residence of one or more human
beings; or any vacant land for sale or lease; but does not include
premises maintained by the owner or lessee as the household of his
family with or without domestic servants and not more than four
boarders or lodgers.a
A. Philosophical Basis for Covering Private Property
In most legal systems the power of the state to control the nature
of the transferor's "right" to transfer property would be unquestioned.
The history of the United States, in contrast, demonstrates an extraor-
dinary devotion to absolutist theories of private property. In the
era of substantive due process limitations on governmental power -
roughly 1885 to 1934 -this country came as close as possible to
considering the right of private property as a natural right of man
beyond the reach of government.4
Because much of the absolute view of private property remains
in our society and is urged to deny the power of the state to deal
with racial discrimination, some examination of the private property
rights argument is necessary. The nature of the argument is best
illustrated by the promulgation of a "Property Owners' Bill of
Rights" by the National Association of Real Estate Boards (NAREB)
which includes the following four "rights":
The right to occupy and dispose of property, without govern-
mental interference, in accordance with the dictates of his conscience.
The right to maintain what, in his opinion, are congenial
surroundings for tenants.
The right to determine the acceptability and desirability of
any prospective buyer or tenant of his property.
The right to enjoy the freedom to accept, reject, negotiate, or
not negotiate with others.
Labeling the above NAREB statements as "rights" can be
justified only by some natural law view of private property. A natural
law property theory starts with the assumption that "God gave to
mankind in general, dominion over all the creatures of the earth
S. ., This assumption must (to avoid a communistic theory) be
refined to determine how particular men acquire "ownership" of
particular things:
[W]e learn how things passed from being held in common
to a state of property. It was not by the act of the mind alone that
this change took place. For men in that case could never know,
'COLO. REv. STAT. § 69-7-3 (1)(d) (1963).
'See, e.g., Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571 (1934) ; Terrace v. Thompson, 263
U.S. 197 (1923); Campbell v. Holt, 115 U.S. 620 (1885) (dissenting opinion).
GRo'rus, WAR AND PEACE, Book II, Ch. 2, § 2 (1925).
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what others intended to appropriate to their own use, so as to exclude
the claim of every other pretender to the same; and many too might
desire to possess the same thing. Property therefore must have
been established either by express agreement, as by division, or by
tacit consent, as by occupancy."
This notion that property rights are created by occupancy was aug-
mented by John Locke's articulation of the labor theory of private
property in his Two Treatises of Government:
Though the Earth, and all inferior Creatures be common to all
Men, yet every Man has a Property in his own Person. This no Body
has any Right to but himself. The Labour of his Body, and the
Work of his hands, we may say, are properly his. Whatsoever,
then, he removes out of the State that Nature hath provided, and
left it in, he hath mixed his Labour with, and joyned to it some-
thing that is his own, and thereby makes it his property.
7
Mr. Justice Pitney used the labor theory of Locke to find a property
right in the famous case of International News Service v. Associated
Press:
And although we may and do assume that neither party has
any remaining property interest as against the public in uncopy-
righted news matter after the moment of its first publication, it by
no means follows that there is no remaining property interest in it
as between themselves. For, to both of them alike, news matter,
however little susceptible of ownership or dominion in the absolute
sense, is stock in trade, to be gathered at the cost of enterprise,
organization, skill, labor, and money, and to be distributed and sold
to those who will pay money for it, as for any other merchandise.
Regarding the news, therefore, as but the material out of which both
parties are seeking to make profits at the same time and in the same
field, we hardly can fail to recognize that for this purpose, and as
between them, it must be regarded as quasi property, irrespective of
the rights of either as against the public.8
Alongside the occupancy and labor theories used to justify the
concept of private property grew the theory that ownership of
property consisted of many rights. One Roman law definition of
property, Dominium est jus utendi et abutendi re, was understood
to mean that the right of property carries with it the right to use or
abuse a thing. Although writers have shown that abutendi means "to
consume" and not "to abuse" and that the following clause of the
Roman definition, quatenus juris ratio patitur (in so far as the reason
of law permits), negates the right of misuse, the combination of
Grotius, Locke, and the Roman law coalesced in Blackstone's famous
definition of property as the "sole and despotic dominion which one
man claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in
total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe."'
I id.
'LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, Book II, Ch. 5, § 27 (1890).
S 2 4 8 U.S. 215, 236 (1918).
*2 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, *2.
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Due to the strong influence of Locke on the Founders of the
American Republic and also due to the extensive influence of Black-
stone's Commentaries on the legal profession in the American Col-
onies, the American Constitution might be interpreted to embody
the Locke theory of property and the Blackstone definition of prop-
erty. Support for this view materialized when the Supreme Court
utilized the Fourteenth Amendment to review the merits of state
economic regulation and social legislation.1"
The strong background of natural property rights of an absolute
nature in this country has had several effects. Most important, the
legal revolution which accompanied the industrial revolution was
retarded in the United States. In England, by contrast, legal institu-
tions responded more easily to the industrial revolution and shifted
from a natural law view of property to a theory of social utility,
traceable to Jeremy Bentham.
Bentham's view (epitomized in his statement, "Property and
law are born together, and die together. Before laws were made
there was no property; take away laws and property ceases."") strips
away the natural law mystery of property and replaces it with a
theory that the state protects private property because security of
ownership and security of title are more beneficial to social progress
than absence of such security."2
Benthamite utilitarianism and the social utility theory of private
property are, of course, adequate to justify a free enterprise economic
system. However, the theory also supports governmental interfer-
ence with private property to promote a greater social good. There-
fore, whenever the state finds a sufficient public welfare interest
which requires a restriction on private property, no mystical natural
law principle or constitutional provision should prevent such an
exercise of the police power." The question in such situations is
really whether society would benefit more from the protection of the
private property interest involved than from securing the other social
goal. The answer to the question of desirability, of course, depends
on one's view of the role of government in the lives of citizens; the
dispute is usually between those who favor positive government and
those who believe in as little government as possible. 4
The conclusion that the philosophical basis of private property
is not a function of natural law principles but rather is an outgrowth
" See Hamilton, Property - According to Locke, 41 Yale L. J. 864 (1932).
"BENTHAM, THEORY OF LEGISLATION 113 (1864).
"Id. at 115-119.
"1 See, e.g., Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
, This dispute is beyond the scope of this paper. For a general discussion of the two




of the social utility of protecting security is buttressed by twentieth
century developments in industrial capitalism. 5 Also of interest is a
study of the history of restrictions on private property in the common
law countries, a history which demonstrates that private property was
never in practice considered absolute and beyond the reach of the
state.
The common law has developed over the centuries several areas
where the owner's "right" to dispose of his property in any fashion
he desires is curtailed by law. Some general examples would be bars
on illegal or antisocial dispositions, the law dealing with restraints
on alienation, and the Rule Against Perpetuities. 6 These restrictions
on the power to dispose are rooted in social welfare considerations
and thus support the social utility theory of property.
Along with legal restrictions on the power to dispose of property
a lengthy history of restrictions on the use of property can be dis-
cerned. In the twelfth century the assize of nuisance can be regarded
as the origin of law of nuisance which requires the owner of land to
refrain from using his property in such a way as to injure his neigh-
bor." As early as 1388 a statute was passed restricting property
owners from polluting the air:
[Flor that so much dung and filth of the garbage and intrails
[sic], as well of beasts killed, as of other corruptions, be cast and put
in ditches, rivers, and other waters, and also within many other
places, within, about, and nigh unto divers cities, boroughs, and
towns of the realm, and the suburbs of them, that the air there is
greatly corrupt and infect, and many maladies and other intolerable
diseases do daily happen . . . to the great annoyance, damage and
peril of the inhabitants ....
In 1427 after a series of damaging floods Parliament imposed flood
control regulations on property owners 9 and modern building codes
can be traced back to the aftermath of the London fire of 1666:
Forasmuch as the city of London . . . by reason of a most
dreadful fire lately happening therein, was for the most part thereof
burnt down and destroyed within the compass of a few days, and
now lies buried in its own ruins: for the speedy restauration [sic]
whereof, and for the better regulation, uniformity and gracefulness
of such new buildings as shall be erected . . . and to the end that
great and outragious [sic] fires ... so far forth as human provi-
dence .. .can foresee, may be reasonably prevented or obviated for
See, e.g., Renner, THE INSTITUTIONS OF PRIVATE LAW (introduction by Kahn-Freund)
(1949) ; Philbrick, Changing Conceptions of Property in Law, 86 U. PA. L. REV. 691
(1938).
"RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY §§ 370-438 (1936); Schnebly, Restraints upon the
Alienation of Legal Interest, 44 YALE L.J. 961, 1186, 1380 (1935).
IT McRae, The Development of Nuisance in the Early Common Law, 1 U. FLA. L. REV.
27 (1948).
"12 Rich. 2, c. 13 (1388).
'6 Hen. 6, c. 5 (1427).
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the time to come, both by the matter and form of such building
• . . [there follows several pages of building specifications] .20
These ancient restrictions on the use of property offer support
for the conclusion that the social utility theory of property is not a
modern concept invented to justify modern restrictions. Modern
limitations on the use of property such as zoning,21 urban re-
newal,"2 restrictions on riparian owners,23 to name but a few, have
their roots in the historically constant theory that the social welfare
authorizes the state to regulate the "rights" of property owners.
No philosophical or historical approach supports the idea of
absolute property rights. The NAREB "Property Owners' Bill of
Rights" has no factual basis and expresses merely a desire that the
state should not interfere with the property owner's personal choice
to discriminate against prospective transferees for racial, religious,
or any other reasons. Consequently, the argument over the propriety
of including private housing in fair housing legislation is reduced to a
weighing of the social benefits and detriments flowing from such a
decision.
B. The Arguments for and Against Fair Housing
Assuming that the foregoing analysis of property rights is correct
the only possible conclusion is that the battle over regulation of racial
discrimination in private housing does not involve an irreconcilable
conflict between "property rights" and "human rights." The real
battle should center about whether the problems caused or perpetuated
by discriminatory housing practices are severe enough to justify a
legal redefinition of property. To understand the real issues the
arguments offered by both sides will be examined.
Although the arguments offered in favor of state fair housing
legislation center about the notion that racial and religious discrimina-
tion is contrary to the American ideal, some of the specifics of that
notion are of particular interest. Thus, without attempting to exhaust
all the possible arguments, the four which will be discussed are:
1) discrimination in private housing exists and is an extensive
problem; 2) discrimination harms the individual discriminated
against; 3) discrimination in housing is uneconomic and a serious
waste; 4) discrimination in private housing helps perpetuate segre-
gated education.
, 19 Car. 2, c. 3 (1666).
See, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
See e.g., Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
See e.g., United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499 (1945).
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That racial discrimination in housing exists no one will dispute.
In the first half of the twentieth century as urbanization and the
Negro migration to northern cities developed, institutions designed
to assure segregated housing also developed. Two of the most im-
portant such institutions were the racial restrictive covenant 1 and the
real estate industry practice of not "breaking" neighborhoods." As a
testament to the success of discriminatory housing practices and as an
indication of how extensive the problem is, the 1960 census figures
are revealing. The 1960 population of America's ten largest cities
was 21,751,334; 27.4 per cent of this population (4,655,505) was
Negro. In contrast, the standard metropolitan area population out-
side those cities was 18,271,039 of which only 5.4 per cent (809,134)
was Negro. The lily-white suburb is an actuality. Furthermore, the
population growth figures for the 1930-1960 period are even more
indicative of the extent of the problem of the Negro ghetto and
white suburb. The total population growth in the ten largest cities
in the period 1930-1960 was 3,480,295; the Negro population in-
crease in the same period was 3,222,347 (92 per cent). In contrast
suburban growth was 4,174,537 with a Negro gain of 146,540 (3.5
per cent) .26 Evidently, then, the large central cities are becoming
Negro ghettoes while the white population is fleeing to racially
restricted suburbs. If this situation remains unchecked, the ultimate
possibility of an all-Negro city surrounded by all-white suburbs
would be disastrous.
The second argument for regulating private housing - that
discrimination harms the individual - is, likewise, not often disputed.
However, the Negro does dispute, with probable justification, the
Some of the early cases upholding racial restrictive covenants are Corrigan v. Buckley,
271 U.S. 323 (1926); Los Angeles Inv. Co. v. Gary, 181 Cal. 680, 186 Pac. 596
(1919); Queensborough Land Co. v. Cazeaux, 136 La. 724, 67 So. 641 (1915)
Parmlee v. Morris, 218 Mich. 625, 188 N.W. 330 (1922); Koehler v. Rowland,
275 Mo. 573, 205 S.W. 217 (1918) ; Keltner v. Harris, 196 S.W. 1 (Mo. S. Ct.)
(1917). In the Parmalee case the trial corut said (188 N.W. at 331 ):
The law is powerless to eradicate racial instincts or to abolish distinctions
which some citizens do draw on account of racial differences in relation to
their matters of purely private concern. For the law to attempt to abolish
these distinctions in the private dealings between individuals would only
serve to accentuate the difficulties, which the situation presents.
The Missouri Supreme Court said, in Keltner v. Harris, 196 S.W. at 2, "[I1f it was
distasteful to plaintiff to have a colored man as his neighbor, he had a legal right to
refuse to sell him or his agents the property in controversy."
'NAREB Code of Ethics (1950): "A Realtor should never be instrumental in intro-
ducing into a neighborhood a character of property or occupancy, members of any race
or nationality, or any individual whose presence will be clearly detrimental to property
values in that neighborhood." The Code was amended in 1950 to remove the clause
about race and nationality.
'Miller, Government's Responsibility for Residential Segregation, in RACE AND) PROP-
ERTs 58, 59 (Denton ed. 1964).
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ability of a member of the white majority to feel the indignity,
deprivation, and suffering felt by the victim of enforced racial
discrimination. The answer so often given by the opponents of fair
housing to the effect that the majority of Negroes prefer to live
among their own kind2" ignores the very important distinction be-
tween voluntary and involuntary segregation. As was pointed out by
one author:
The voluntary congregation of people who seek each other's society
is an exercise of freedom... [bjut segregation that is enforced
upon a group is a deprivation of freedom - a deprivation especially
erroneous when its basis is the unalterable fact of race or ancestry. 2s
The fact that housing discrimination today is enforced by custom
and convention rather than law does not render it less compulsory.
Thus, the hurt to the Negro psyche in and of itself should be a
sufficient reason to support fair housing.29
The third argument - that discriminatory housing is socially
and economically wasteful - is based on the evidence that segre-
gated housing in the cities is generally lower quality housing. If the
housing available to the Negro in the city is limited in area the market
forces of supply and demand result in high rent for substandard
housing which results in an absence of financial incentive for im-
provement of living conditions. The white rationalization for this
waste is likely to be that the housing only reflects different culture
and earning power. The ultimate expression of this type of rational-
ization is expressed in the following description of housing in South
Africa:
Discrimination is expressed in the concept of different stand-
ards of housing and of amenity for the different racial groups. There
is African Housing (that is to say, Bantu or Negro Housing), Colored
Housing, Indian Housing and European Housing. The quality of
the housing is immediately conveyed by these terms. Public housing
policy is defined on the basis of an image of appropriate standards
for each of the racial groups. In the past, the failure to build houses
for Africans in the cities forced large numbers into improvised shacks
of corrugated iron and sacking, the so-called shanty towns. Some
of these slums still persist, but they are now being replaced by small
family homes. Under a policy of low-cost housing for Africans,
many items conducive to comfort are eliminated. For example,
One study by Mr. Mays, Chairman of the Housing Committee of the Urban League in
Los Angeles, estimated that over 90 per cent of Los Angeles Negroes prefer to live
in the center of the Negro section of the community.
MCENTIRE, RESIDENCE AND RACE 88 (1960).
For additional material on the hurt to the Negro see generally, the novels of James
Baldwin. For evidence that integrated housing does not harm the white psyche see,




houses may be built without any inner doors, and the allocation of
floor space could hardly be more modest. There is a sharp contrast
between the bare confined utility of homes for Africans and the
more expansive and civilized standards the authorities consider
appropriate for whites. The same contrast is to be found in the
provision of neighborhood amenities. Rough, neglected roads and
raw, unlighted sidewalks characterize the nonwhite residential
areas o30
In the United States the nonwhite families have been able to improve
their incomes much more rapidly than their housing"' thus perpetuat-
ing the urban ills of crime, unemployment, and juvenile delinquency.
The relationship between discriminatory housing and segregated
schools needs no documentation. The neighborhood public school is
such a solid reality in our society that experiments in transporting
children to non-neighborhood schools to correct racial imbalances
have met with resounding resistance. The failure of the Supreme
Court to entertain arguments that school districts have an affirmative
duty to integrate schools (as opposed to the duty to desegregate)
32
has served to emphasize the close connection between ghetto housing
and ghetto schools. In the cities, at least, the problem of satisfactory
education for minority group children will be partially solved by
removing barriers to interracial housing.
Turning now to the most frequently voiced arguments against
coverage of private housing, the four selected for discussion here are:
1) discrimination will not be cured by statutory compulsion but only
by education; 2) nonwhite families in a neighborhood will lower
property values; 3) fair housing legislation is an undesirable restric-
tion on the individual's freedom of personal choice; and 4) anti-
discrimination commissions are usually composed of people unduly
sympathetic to minority groups thus imposing a severe burden upon
respondents.
The first argument - that prejudice can be eliminated only
through education and not by statute - is based on the idea that the
people are not ready for state regulation of private housing. The
proponents of this argument point to the experience with prohibition
earlier in this century and to the action of the citizens of California
' Kuper, Sociological Aspects of Housing Discrimination, in RACE AND PROPERTY 122
(Denton ed. 1964). See also the novel, PATON, CRY THE BELOVED COUNTRY (1948).
' For example, in Denver the 1950 Census shows 8,035 nonwhite persons having
incomes with 95 (1.2 per cent) having incomes of over $5,000; in 1960 19,646
nonwhites had incomes of which 2,912 (14.8 per cent) had incomes of over $5,000.
See generally, HOUSING AND HOME FINANCE AGENCY, OUR NONWHITE POPULATION
AND ITS HOUSING (1963).
"See Bell v. School City of Gary, Ind., 324 F.2d 209 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied,
377 U.S. 924 (1964) ; Downs v. Board of Education of Kansas City, Kans., 336 F.2d
988 (10th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 85 Sup. Ct. 898 (1965).
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adopting Proposition 14 in the 1964 election.33  The difficulty with
the argument is that it attempts to prove too much. One object of
almost every piece of legislation is to affect morality,3" and in a
representative democracy the legislature should consider whether the
legal duties imposed by a statute are so obnoxious to the felt morality
of the governed that peoples' behavior will not be changed. Under-
standably, many people might be opposed to fair housing legislation,
but as of this writing no state has reported a groundswell of resistance
to its statute similar to resistance to statutes during the era of prohibi-
tion. As for the California vote, the only inference possible is that
a majority of the voters for whatever reason or for no reason voted
in favor of Proposition 14. How can one interpret such a vote as
showing that fair housing runs counter to the positive morality of
the people? The only possible way of determining whether a statute
goes too far in attempting to change behavior is to observe the
operation of the statute.
The argument that nonwhite residents lower property values
has never been scientifically demonstrated. The few studies that have
been made on the question tend to show otherwise - that race
does not affect property values.35 Also, the lending institutions seem
to have encountered little difficulty in lending to nonwhites:
The Bowery Savings Bank is one of the largest lenders on
mortgage [sicJ in the country. It is the largest mutual savings
bank in the world. That bank has followed successfully the policy
of making loans on mortgages without regard to race, color, creed,
or national origin of either the owners or the tenants of the prop-
erties. Its experience with those mortgages has been just [as] good
as its experience with any other type of loan that it has made. It
Proposition 14 was an initiated amendment to the California Constitution providing.
The People of the State of California do enact the following constitu-
tional amendment to be added as Section 26 of Article I of the Constitution
of the State of California:
Neither the State nor any subdivision or agency thereof shall deny, limit
or abridge, directly or indirectly, the right of any person, who is willing or
desires to sell, lease or rent any part or all of his real property, to decline
to sell, lease or rent such property to such person or persons as he, in his
absolute discretion, chooses.
"Person" includes individuals, partnerships, corporations and other legal
entities and their agents or representatives but does not include the State
or any subdivision thereof with respect to the sale, lease, or rental of prop-
erty owned by it.
"Real property" consists of any interests in real property of any kind
or quality, present or future, irrespective of how obtained or financed, which
is used, designed, constructed, zoned or otherwise devoted to or limited for
residential purposes whether as a single family dwelling or as a dwelling for
two or more persons or families living together or independently of each
other....
"See generally, COHEN, ETHICAL SYSTEMS AND LEGAL IDEALS (1933); FULLER, THE
MORALITY OF LAW '(1964).
"See Case and Clark, Property and Race in RACE AND PROPERTY 114 (Denton ed.
1964); U. S. HOUSING AND HOME FINANCE AGENCY, EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN
HOUsINGs A SERIES OF CASE STUDIES (1964); LAURENTI, PROPERTY VALUES AND
RACE: STUDIES IN SEVEN CITIES (1960).
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has millions of dollars of mortgages on properties owned by or
occupied by minority groups, particularly nonwhites, and it has
millions of dollars of loans on real estate properties which are open
to occupancy by any person who is qualified economically to pay the
rent or pay the price for the housing; and, as I say, its experience
with respect to those loans has been just as favorable as its exper-
ience with respect to other loans that it has made. 6
In those areas where there are no established property values, such
as a builder's subdivision, studies have indicated that the presence
of a Negro purchaser does not make the sale or rental of immediately
adjacent housing to a white purchaser any more difficult."
The most difficult argument to deal with made by the oppon-
ents of fair housing is that the state is unduly restricting the free
personal choice of the individual property owner. 8 If our society
believes that an important aspect of freedom is the maximization of
the personal choices of every citizen, then why should the state
interfere with the very intimate personal choice of who buys or rents
one's property? Should not the property owner be able to refuse
to rent or sell for any reason or no reason at all? One answer is that
in any society the personal choice of racial or religious discrimination
may be outweighed by society's interest in overcoming the evils of
discrimination. A more specific answer is that in the usual transfer
of housing situation the transferor is not attempting to play the role
of sociologist. The typical seller is interested in the economic abilities
of the potential buyer, not the color of his skin. Others, such as
neighbors and realtors, are more likely to have an interest in the
race of the buyer or renter. The seller normally is interested only in
selling and were it not for outside pressures he would probably sell
to the first buyer with money in hand. Realistically speaking, fair
housing does not diminish a seller's freedom in a meaningful way.
Testimony of Earl B. Schwulst before the United States Commission on Civil Rights,
U.S. Comm. on Civil Rights, Hearings Held in New York February 2-3, 1959, at 31
(1960).
reHOUSING AND HOME FINANCE AGENCY, EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN HOUSING: A
SERIES OF CASE STUDIES, 9 (1964).
"Where the property owner is a corporation, the argument is less persuasive. See Mr.
Justice Douglas' concurring opinion in Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 252, 261
(1964):
The problem in this case, and in the other sit-in cases before us, is
presented as though it involved the situation of "a private operator conduct-
ing his own business on his own premises and exercising his own judgment"
[citation omitted] as to whom he will admit to the premises .... So far as
the corporate owner is concerned, what constitutional right is vindicated?
It is said that ownership of property carries the right to use it in association
with such people as the owner chooses. The corporate owners in these cases
-the stockholders- are unidentified members of the public at large, who
probably never saw these petitioners [Negro sit-in demonstrators], who may
never have frequented these restaurants. What personal rights of theirs
would be vindicated by affirmance [of the convictions] ? .. .Who in this
situation, is the corporation? Whose racial prejudices are reflected in "its"
decision to refuse service to Negroes? The racial prejudices of the manager?
Of the stockholders? Of the Board of Directors?
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Indeed, a fair housing statute may enhance his freedom in providing
a greater potential market for his housing and in providing a legal
scapegoat for the neighbors. Another consideration is that inter-
racial housing may, instead of creating societal friction, achieve
positive good in reducing racial disharmony,39 thus enhancing and
enriching the lives of those in the community. Finally, one must also
consider that fair housing legislation may help to maximize the
freedom of the minority-group individual who is seeking to fulfill
the promise of equal opportunity."
The argument that fair housing statutes are administered by
commissions slanted in favor of minority groups thus favoring com-
plainants and discrediting respondents may be answered in several
ways. First, the policy underlying the creation of many administrative
agencies has been a conscious desire on the part of the legislature to
have a statute administered by a body sympathetic with the aims of
the statute. For example, the reason workmen's compensation statutes
are administered by agencies is because the courts proved unsympa-
thetic to the claims of injured workmen. 1 To argue that the precon-
ceived bias of a "do-good" agency renders the agency incompetent is.
thus, to ignore that historically all agencies have a "program" which
may, will, and should require them to resolve doubts in favor of the
program,4 - and that judges and juries also have preconceived biases. 3
Second, fair housing decisions, like those of other administrative
GORDON, ASSIMILATION IN AMERICAN LIFE (1964); WILLIAMS, STRANGERS NEXT
DOOR (1964); GRIER AND GRIER, PRIVATELY DEVELOPED INTERRACIAL HOUSING
(1960); STETLER, RACIAL INTEGRATION IN PRIVATE RESIDENTIAL NEIGHBORHOODS
IN CONNECTICUT '(1957); WILNER, WALKLEY AND COOK, HUMAN RELATIONS IN
INTERRACIAL HOUSING (1955); DEUTSCH AND COLLINS, INTERRACIAL HOUSING:
A PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATION OF A SOCIAL EXPERIMENT (1951); FESTINGER,
SCHACTER AND BACK, SOCIAL PRESSURES IN INFORMAL GROUPS (1950).
"But c.f., Robbins, A Critical Analysis of Anti-Discrimination Housing Laws, in RACE
AND PROPERTY 88, 95 (Denton ed. 1964) where the author cites as evidence that
fair housing does not accomplish its intended purpose part of a New York Times
article of Jan. 7, 1961:
A Negro woman lives with her two children in a Staten Island [hous-
ing] project. She travels each day to her job in upper Manhattan [a two-hour
ride each way].
To save money and spend more time with her children- reasons the
Authority would ordinarily accept -she asked to be transferred to a project
near her job. She is turned down because she is a Negro and the available
units are being held for whites to improve integration at the project.
This "evidence" appears to be a hypothetical situation constructed by the reporter. id., p.
1, col. 2. For a contrary view, see HOUSING AND HOME FINANCE AGENCY, EQUAL OP-
PORTUNITY IN HOUSING: A SERIES OF CASE STUDIES '(1964). For general views of the
constitutional issues in racial quota situations, see Bittker, The Case of the Checker-
Board Ordinance: An Experiment in Race Relations, 71 YALE L.J. 1387 (1962);
Hellerstein, The Benign Quota, Equal Protection, and "The Rule in Shelley's Case,"
17 RUTGERS L. REV. 531 (1963).
'See GELLHORN AND BYSE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 9, (4th Ed. 1960); c.f., Jaffe,
Invective and Investigation in Administrative Law, 52 HARv. L. REV. 1201, 1218
(1939).
GELLHORN AND BYSE, op. cit. supra note 40, at 29.
JAFFE, op. cit. supra note 40, at 1218.
VOL. XLI1
FAIR HOUSING
agencies, are subject to the safeguards of judicial review.44 Third, an
examination of the disposition of complaints by the agencies tends
to show that an "accusatorial" and not "inquisitorial" approach is
taken. The reports of the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Commission
disclose that, from 1962 to 1964, 73 complaints were filed under
the Colorado Fair Housing Act; of the 73, 2 were dropped, 32 were
dismissed, 25 were conciliated, and only 14 reached the hearing
stage. 5 These statistics indicate that the Commission does a pretty
good job of weeding out the unjustified and unsubstantiated com-
plaints, refuting the indiscriminate attack upon the "do-gooder"
agency.
Unfortunately, the arguments for and against fair housing legis-
tion are usually made in the abstract. A typical statement supporting
fair housing is that made by Milton Gordon:
[T]he price of discrimination, in terms of welfare costs, law en-
forcement, educational services, and other social factors, is being
recognized by the public as too high.
In effect, these findings cry for the old concept of a free, open,
private enterprise market in the field of housing. Thus, govern-
mental action against private discrimination may, paradoxically, be
justified in terms of free private enterprise! The individual buying a
house is asking that his dollar be treated in the housing market as it
is in the automobile market....
No reasonable person will contest the principle that a man's
home is his castle. But, when this man, of his own free will, offers
for a consideration to dispossess himself of that castle, he must neces-
sarily grant to the potential purchaser the same privileges.46
Similarly, the argument against fair housing is typically abstract:
Some proponents of legislation forcing property owners to deal
with minority group members against their will recognize the thin-
ness of their legal position. They also recognize that where legisla-
tion is being considered to correct what some consider a moral
fault of society, there is considerable ground for the statement, "You
cannot legislate morality." So they attempt to erect a legal founda-
tion to support their position.
They begin with a fallacy and then spend thousands of words
erecting a magnificent edifice on that fallacy. The fallacy is the
assumption that the right of the owner of residential property to
resist governmental control of the property itself is the issue. They
conveniently overlook the fact that, in this instance, government is
not limiting the owner's right to control the property itself. It is
limiting his right to deal or to decline to deal, with another indi-
vidual concerning that property. 47
E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 69-7-7 (1963).
COLORADO ANTI-DISCRIMINATION COMMISSION, NINTH ANNUAL REPORT 12 (1963)
and TENTH ANNUAL REPORT 13 (1964).
Gordon, Property Rights and Civil Rights: The Role of Government, in RAcE AND
PROPERTY 42, 51 (Denton ed. 1964).
, Robbins, op. cit. supra note 39, at 93.
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The difficulty with such statements is that they tend to focus
the controversy on the broad philosophical and legal questions rather
than on the practical problems of effective legislation. Of greater
significance is the question of what fair housing legislation can and
cannot do or what it will and will not do. Therefore, following is a
list of some general observations about the effective limits of a fair
housing statute:
1. Fair housing does not guarantee interracial housing. The
state cannot prevent a mass exodus of white residents when a Negro
moves into the neighborhood.
2. On the other hand, one ultimate goal of fair housing is to
insure that no neighborhood is immune from minority group resi-
dents thus removing incentive for a white resident to move upon the
appearance of a Negro family; if there is no place to run to, bi-
racial neighborhoods could become the rule rather than the exception.
3. Fair housing cannot cure the problem of the ghetto; a
statute cannot provide housing for a particular family (except, of
course, public housing), only economic ability and overcoming the
fears of leaving the ghetto can accomplish that purpose.
4. A fair housing statute will have greater impact in the new
housing market and apartment-house market than in the used single-
family dwelling market, because of the greater difficulty in proving
discrimination where the respondent is disposing of only one hous-
ing unit. Also, a neighborhood social structure is less evident in
new subdivisions or apartment areas.
5. Fair housing can work well only with the cooperation of
the real estate industry. The opportunities for evasion are too num-
erous to expect a statute to be effective without industry cooperation.
II. DEVELOPMENTS UNDER THE 1959 ACT
Although Connecticut is generally recognized as the first state
to adopt a fair housing statute 48 the statute dealt only with discrim-
ination in public housing. The Colorado Act of 1959 was the first
state to cover discrimination in private housing.4 However, the act
did not cover all private housing. In the definition section "housing"
was defined as
... any building, structure, or part thereof which is used or occupied,
or is intended, arranged or designed to be used or occupied as the
home or residence of one or more human beings; or any vacant land
for sale or lease; but does not include premises maintained by the
owner or lessee as the household of his family with or without
domestic servants and not more than four boarders or lodgers.- o
SCONN. GEN. STAT. TITLE 64, c. 417, Sec. 1407b (1949), now CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 53-35 (Supp. 1964).
"New York City and Pittsburgh, Pa. had fair housing ordinances covering private
housing as early as 1957. Soon after the Colorado Act became effective on May 1,
1959 three other states passed statutes (presumably the statutes were being considered
in the legislatures contemporaneously with the Colorado Act). See: CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 53-35 (Supp. 1964) ; MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 151B, §§ 4.3B, 4.6, and
4.7 (Supp. 1964) ; ORE. REV. STAT. § 659.033 (1963).
'°COLO. REV. STAT. § 69-7-3(1)(c) (1963).
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This legislative exclusion of owner-occupied housing effectively
limited application of the act to apartments, new housing, and the
few cases of vacant used houses.
Administration of the act was placed with the Colorado Anti-
Discrimination Commission,5 the agency which had been created in
1957 to administer the state fair employment practices act.52 Much
of the Fair Housing Act was patterned after the Fair Employment
Act.35
A. The Legal Developments
Between May 1, 1959, and June 30, 1960, fourteen fair housing
complaints were filed with the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Com-
mission. 4 One of these, filed on September 18, 1959, against the
J. L. Case and Company, Realtors, was destined to become the test
case for Colorado Supreme Court consideration of the validity of the
Fair Housing Act.5
The essential facts involved in the case showed that the com-
plainants, a Negro couple, answered an advertisement, for sale of a
home in Colorado Springs, inserted by the owner who was a real
estate broker. After visiting the property and giving the salesman a
$500 deposit, the Negroes were informed by another employee of
the broker that they would be unhappy in the neighborhood. The
Negroes insisted on purchasing the house, whereupon they were told
it had already been sold; actually, the house was conveyed to one of
the broker's salesmen who subsequently resold the house to a white
purchaser (at a lower price than agreed upon in the arrangement
with complainants).
After a hearing in March, 1960, the Anti-Discrimination Com-
mission found that an unfair housing practice had been committed
and entered an order ordering the respondents to cease and desist
from the unfair housing practices and to "afford to these complain-
ants the opportunity of purchasing a comparable home as the home
in question in the same general neighborhood or a comparable
neighborhood . . . under the same terms and conditions as such a
home would be offered to any other person." The Commission also
ordered the respondents to report periodically on the manner of their
compliance."
Upon judicial review in the district court that portion of the act
' COLO. REV. STAT. § 69-7-2 (1963).
52 See Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act of 1957, CoLO. REV. STAT. § 80-21-2 to 7
(1963).
' Compare, e.g., COLO. REV STAT. §§ 69-7-6, 69-7-7, 80-24-7, 80-24-8 (1963).
"SIXTH ANNUAL REPORT, COLORADO ANTI-DISCRIMINATION COMMISSION 10 (1960).
'Colorado Anti-Discrimination Comm'n v. Case, 151 Colo. 235, 380 P. 2d 34 (1962).
56 151 Colo. at 240-241, 380 P.2d at 38.
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authorizing the Commission to enter the order " was held unconsti-
tutional as being vague and indefinite and an unlawful delegation
of legislative power.5" The Commission appealed to the supreme
court where the respondents argued, in addition to the delegation
point, that the Fair Housing Act violated the Colorado Constitution by
taking of private property for private use, " by infringing on the in-
alienable right to select the person with whom one contracts,6" by
deprivation of property without due process,61 and by denying equal
protection through unreasonably classifying in regard to owner-
occupied housing. 2
To all of the respondent's arguments founded on the concept of
inalienable property rights, the court, through Justice Moore, re-
sponded in kind by finding corresponding and overbalancing human
rights, equally inalienable and equally inherent:
We have no hesitancy in stating there are fundamental and
inherent rights with which all humans are endowed even though no
specific mention is made of them in either the national or state
constitutions.3
The court then discussed the Ninth Amendment to the Constitution
and the Colorado Constitution, Article II, Section 28 and concluded
the first part of the opinion,
We hold that the Act here in question has a substantial relation
to a legitimate object for the exercise of the police power, and that
it is appropriate for the promotion of that object. We constantly
speak of "equality of opportunity" as a foundation stone of the
American way of life. We solemnly proclaim that "All men are
created equal"; that "all men" have the inalienable right of acquir-
ing, possessing and protecting property. We hold that as an un-
enumerated inalienable right a man has the right to acquire one of
the necessities of life, a home for himself and those dependent upon
him, unfettered by discrimination against him on account of his
race, creed or color. The act of the legislature here in question is
fully justified by Article II, Section 28, of the Constitution of Colo-
" COLO. REV. STAT. § 69-7-6 (12) (1963):
If, upon all of the evidence at a hearing, the commission shall find that the
respondent has engaged in or is engaging in an unfair housing practice . . .
the commission shall . . . issue . . . an order requiring such respondent to
cease and desist from such unfair housing practice and to take such affirma-
tive action, including (but not limited to) the transfer, rental, or lease of
housing, the making of reports as to the manner of compliance, and such
other action as in the judgment of the commission will effectuate the pur-
poses of this article.
" 151 Colo. at 241-242, 380 P.2d 38.
"COLO. CONST., art II, § 14.
"COLO. CoNsT., art II, § 3.
CoLo. CONST., art. II, § 25; U.S. CONST., amend. XIV.
Ibid.
" 151 Colo. at 243-44, 380 P.2d at 39.
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rado and the Ninth Amendment of the Constitution of the United
States.14
The court answered the taking of private property argument by
pointing out that the act comes into operation only after the owner of
the property, of his own free will, places the property on the open
market.
The second part of the court's opinion dealt with the problem
of whether Section 6(12) of the act"5 is an unlawful delegation of
legislative power. The court held that the portion of the section
empowering the Commission to take "such other action as in the
judgment of the Commission will effectuate the purposes of this
article" is an unlawful delegation: "The legislature cannot delegate to
any administrative agency 'carte blanche' authority to impose sanc-
tions or penalties for violation of the substantive portion of a sta-
tute.''" Because the order of the Commission went beyond the areas
specifically mentioned in the statute (cease and desist order, order
the transfer, rental or lease of housing) the case was remanded to the
district court.
The court's opinion is quite puzzling, almost schizophrenic in
that the first part represents an extremely liberal philosophy of
"human rights" prevailing over "property rights," while the second
part represents an exceedingly conservative, retrogressive view of
the delegation doctrine.s However, the opinion was generally hailed
by the supporters of fair housing because of the court's broad lan-
guage sustaining the concept of the act. The part of the opinion
dealing with the Commission's power to fashion remedies left in
limbo the practical effect of Commission activity in fair housing
cases, and soon led to the call for new legislation.
B. The Administrative Developments
The decision of the supreme court in Colorado Anti-Discrimina-
tion Commission v. Case 8 was finally handed down on April 8,
1963. Soon thereafter the Commission, feeling its enforcement
powers to be severely curtailed, discouraged the filing of complaints
in cases where the staff felt an effective order could not be entered.
Table 1 illustrates the number of fair housing complaints filed each
151 Colo. at 247, 380 P.2d at 41.
See note 54, supra.
151 Colo. at 250, 380 P.2d at 43.
"See Gitelman, One Year Review of Constitutional Law, 40 DENVER L. CENT. J. 134,
145-149 (1963).
es 151 Colo. 235, 380 P.2d 34 (1962).
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year and the comparison between the number of fair housing com-
plaints and fair employment and public accommodations complaints:
TABLE 1
Year: 1959-1960 1960-1961 1961-1962 1962-1963 1963-1964
Fair
Housing 14* 47 53 54 19
Public
Accommodations 6 18 18 8 10
Fair
Employment 27 62 49 38 64
TOTAL 47 127 120 100 93
*The Fair Housing Act became effective May 1, 1959.
The above comparisons demonstrate that the applause for the
Case decision and its broad support for equal opportunity in housing
was premature. The Commission was losing ground in enforcing the
act and property owners and managers bent on maintaining discrim-
inatory practices were discovering the ease with which the act could
be avoided.
Both the members of the Anti-Discrimination Commission and
the staff spearheaded a drive to seek legislative strengthening of the
Fair Housing Act, using the Case decision as the catalyst to support
repair of the act and new provisions which would give the Commis-
sion additional effective power. The same group of community
organizations that fought for the original act were reactivated to do
battle for new and better fair housing legislation,69 and public pres-
sure was exerted upon the Governor to include fair housing on his
legislative call for the 1964 "short" session of the legislature." The
public pressure culminated in a sit-in demonstration by the Denver
Chapter of the Congress of Racial Equality in the Governor's office.7'
The Governor refused to place fair housing on the legislative call but
did, on June 19, 1964 appoint a sixteen member study committee to
evaluate the Fair Housing Act and make recommendations on any nec-
essary changes in time for submission to the 1965 General Assembly.
III. THE 1965 AMENDMENTS TO THE FAIR HOUSING ACT.
The first meeting of the Governor's Fair Housing Committee
was held on August 14, 1964. At that initial meeting the Committee
'See Coopersmith, How the Colorado Fair Housing Law Was Enacted (mimeo pub-
lished by Mountain States Regional Office, Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith).
"0The Denver Post, Jan. 8, 1964, p. 27, col. 7.
" Id., Jan. 16, 1964, p. 1, col. 8.
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decided that its function was not to deal with the fundamental ques-
tions of having or not having a fair housing statute but to devote its
efforts toward improving the present act. Because the Committee's
findings and recommendations bear a relationship to the amendments
passed by the legislature in 1965, a brief survey of the Committee's
activities and subsequent developments will be helpful in under-
standing the new provisions of the Fair Housing Act."2
A. Background of the Amendents: The Governor's Committee
Soon after the Case decision was handed down, the Anti-Dis-
crimination Commission prepared a general statement covering the
changes it desired in the Fair Housing Act. The Commission's pro-
posals were considered and approved by several community organiza-
tions and, in August of 1964, presented to the Governor's Committee.
The Commission sought the following changes in the act:
1. Add new enforcement section to comply with the Case deci-
sion, and to describe more fully the Commission's enforcement
powers.
2. Expand coverage of the act to include in the definition of
"housing" property during the time it is listed for sale, lease or
rent with any licensed real estate broker or his agent.
3. Give the Commission power to seek a court injunction to
restrain a respondent from transferring the property in dispute
pending final determination by the Commission.
4. Make it an unfair housing practice to discharge or discipline
an employee or agent for complying with the act.
5. Make violation of the act a misdemeanor subject, after con-
viction in court, to fine and/or imprisonment.
6. Expand coverage of the act to include commercial space.
7. Give the Commission power to require the posting of notices.
8. Change the Licensing Act (not the Fair Housing Act) to
make possible suspension or revocation of a real estate broker's
license for violating the provisions of the Fair Housing Act.
Although the Committee held itself open for all suggested
amendments to the act, most of the time and effort of the Committee
was centered about the Commission's proposals, several of which
provided the occasion for extensive discussion and deliberation.
The first controversial Commission proposal dealt with extend-
" The Committee's hearings and deliberations were not transcribed and cannot be cited.
However, the following discussion is based on the notes and recollections of the
author, who was a member of the Committee.
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ing coverage of the act to all private housing when listed with any
licensed real estate broker or his agent. Proponents of such an
amendment pointed out that most real estate transactions are handled
by a licensed broker and that once an owner has listed a house it is
on the public market. Opponents, mostly people in or connected
with the real estate industry were concerned that the proposal places
the onus for discriminatory practices upon the real estate agent rather
than the owner and would disrupt the industry. Further, they argued,
the proposal itself was discriminatory in that the act would not reach
the discriminating owner, but only the real estate agent. Ultimately,
the real estate interests on the Committee expressed their viewpoint
that the 1959 act should not be expanded in coverage at all (improve-
ment of housing opportunity to be accomplished through education)
but if coverage were to be extended, all housing on the market should
be subject to the act. In its final deliberations the Committee by one
vote rejected a proposal to cover all publicly offered housing. How-
ver, the Committee did adopt a proposal initiated by the Commission
to include commercial space in the act.73
The Commission's request for an amendment which would
enable it to seek a court injunction to prevent transfer of property
pending a final administrative decision occasioned more Committee
discussion than any other topic. The Commission argued that its
efforts were easily frustrated by respondents who rendered complaints
moot by transferring the property in dispute. Because the extent
of the Commission's power was to order transfer of the specific
property in question, a sale by the owner soon after the filing of a
complaint meant the Commission could not enter an effective order.
In essence, what was sought by the Commission was some sort of
procedure analagous to an injunction pendente lite. Opponents of
giving injunctive power to the Commission emphasized the dangers
of using such power for harassment and the problem of damage to a
respondent (lost sales) in case of an ultimate victory at the adminis-
trative hearing or where the complainant would ultimately be un-
willing or unable to take the property after favorable decision.
The Governor's Committee was first concerned with the ques-
tion of whether the Commission really needed injunctive power and
"3 The proposal adopted was to include the following in the definition of housing, COLO.
REv. STAT. § 69-7-3(1)(d) (1963),
any space in a building, structure, or portion thereof which is used or oc-
cupied or is intended, arranged, or designed to be used or occupied for the
manufacture, sale, resale, processing, reprocessing, displaying, warehousing,
handling, garaging or distribution of personal property; or any space which
is used or occupied, or is intended, arranged or designed to be used or oc-
cupied as a separate business or professional unit or office in any building,
structure or portion thereof ...
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asked for a report on the disposition of 1962-1964 housing cases. The
Commission provided the following reports:
In reviewing 53 of the housing complaints filed during the
fiscal years of 62-63 and 63-64 dealing with the denial of sale and
rental of housing because of race, creed, color or national ancestry,
we find the following:
Number of cases dismissed (no probable cause) .......... 24
Number of cases closed by conference
or conciliation .................................. 28
Average length of time between date of filing complaint
and date of closing of complaint by conference or
conciliation (i.e., probable cause found) (one case
closed in one day; one case closed after 185 days) . .40 days
Number of complainants who were offered the rental or
sale of the housing in question ...................... 9
Number of cases in which the apartment or house in ques-
tion was sold during the investigation of a complaint .... 11
Number of cases in which complainant moved into
housing being sought .............................. 5
It would seem quite obvious then that in only a very small
percentage of the cases has the Commission been able to make the
specific housing available to the complainant even after probable
cause of discrimination has been found.
7
4
The Committee accepted the need for some sort of injunction pro-
cedure provided that safeguards would be contained in the statute.
Of particular concern were the dangers of tying up property for an
overly long period and of no recompense to the owner for damages
caused by the injunction. The Committee studied the Massachusetts
injunction provision7 5 and considered four alternative provisions
before choosing the following:
After the aforesaid determination by the Commission that probable
cause exists, the Commission or a Commissioner designated by the
Commission for that purpose may also file a petition in the District
Court of the City and County of Denver, or of any county in which
the alleged unfair housing practice occurred, or of any county in
which a respondent resides, seeking appropriate injunctive relief
against such respondent, including orders or decrees restraining
and enjoining him from selling, renting or otherwise making un-
available to the complainant any housing with respect to which the
complaint is made, pending the final determination of proceedings
under this article; provided, however, that no such injunctive relief,
order or decree shall be granted except upon the giving of security
by the person claiming to be aggrieved by the unfair housing
practice, in such sum as the court deems proper, for the payment
U Memorandum from Colorado Anti-Discrimination Commission to Governor's Fair
Housing Study Committee, Sept. 24, 1964 (mimeo).
' MASs. GEN. LAws § 151B § 6 (1958).
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of such costs and damages as may be incurred or suffered by any
party who is found to have been wrongfully enjoined or restrained.
No injunctive relief, order or decree shall be granted except after
hearing, notice of which shall be given to the respondent at least
three days prior thereto by the Commission or Commissioner desig-
nated for that purpose by registered mail directed to the respondent's
last and usual place of abode, together with a copy of such petition,
and provided, further, that such injunctive relief shall expire by its
terms within such time after entry not to exceed 60 days, as the
court fixes, unless within the time so fixed, the order for good cause
shown, is extended for a like period or unless the party against
whom the order is directed consents that it may be extended for a
longer period. An affidavit of notice of hearing shall forthwith be
filed in the office of the clerk of the district court wherein said
petition is filed. The procedure for seeking and granting said in-
junctive reilef, including temporary restraining orders and prelim-
inary injunctions, shall be the procedure provided in the rules of
civil procedure for courts of record in Colorado pertaining to in-
junctions, provided, however, that any provisions contained in such
rules pertaining to the giving of security shall apply to the person
claiming to be aggrieved by the unfair housing practice, and the
district court shall have power to grant such temporary relief or
restraining orders as it deems just and proper.
76
In addition to insisting upon a well-safeguarded injunction pro-
cedure, some members of the Committee felt that the statute should,
as an additional protection to respondents, spell out what constitutes
probable cause for crediting the allegations of a complaint. The
difficulty of defining "probable cause," a nebulous concept at best,
and the danger of hamstringing the investigative staff of the Com-
mission did not deter the Committee from drafting the following
"definition":
Probable cause shall exist if upon all the facts and circumstances
a person of reasonable prudence and caution would be warranted
in a belief that an unfair housing practice had been committed,
provided, however, it shall be sufficient to discredit the allega-
tions of a complaint if the investigating official shall find the
complainant does not have sufficient financial resources to permit
the leasing or purchasing of the housing in issue if the com-
plainant has no bona fide intention of viewing, leasing or pur-
chasing such housing should the same ultimately be made available
to the complainant for such purposes under any of the provisions
of this article. 7
7
The Governor's Committee also adopted proposals dealing with
posting of Commission notices, making refusal to show housing or
transmit offers an unfair practice, and specifying the affirmative
76 Proposed amendment to COLO. REV. STAT. § 69-7-6(6) '(1963).
Proposed amendment to COLO. REV. STAT. § 69-7-6(3) (1963).
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relief which the Commission could give.78  The Committee refused
to recommend amendments which would make violations of the act
a misdemeanor, would subject a discriminating broker to revocation
of his license, or would make discipline of an employee for obeying
the act an unfair housing practice.
The Committee's recommendations were not well received by the
supporters of fair housing who felt the important proposals were
ignored. As reported by Charles Roos in his newspaper column:
... The committee not only didn't rock the boat. It scarcely left
the dock.
It's true the committee does recommend some changes in the
law-to extend coverage to commercial property (a noncontroversial
issue) and, more important, to empower the Anti-Discrimination
Commission to go into court to ask for injunctions....
But the committee chooses, in its recommendations, to bury
three crucial proposals that would have put some steel in the 1959
law:
Specifically, the committee (1) voted to leave the major loop-
hole in the 1959 law: a provision that exempts owner-occupied
houses from the act. The committee (2) declined to consider
any criminal penalty, however slight, for violations of the act.
At the suggestion of its chairman, the committee (3) avoided a
vote on the possibility of action against the license of a real
estate agent who violates the housing law.
There were several reasons for all this:
- Membership of the committee was weighted toward the
estate industry, which plainly wants no strengthening of the 1959
law.
-Of five legislators on the committee, four are Republicans
who had held no positions of real leadership in the General
"The posting proposal would amend COLo. REV. STAT. § 69-7-4(1)(d) to read that
the Commission has power
to adopt, publish, amend, and rescind regulations . . . including the adop-
tion, publication, and amendment of regulations concerning the posting of
notices setting forth provisions of the fair housing act of 1959, provided,
however, that such posting of notices shall by regulation be uniformly ap-
plied to housing or types of housing as defined in this article.
Also, a new section was proposed, COLo. REv. STAT. § 69-7-7(13):
Upon refusal by a person to comply with a regulation of the Commission,
the Commission shall have authority to immediately seek an order in the
district court enforcing such regulation of the Commission; such proceedings
shall be brought in the district court in the county in which the respondent
resides or transacts business.
The proposed amendment to the enforcement section, CoLo. REv. STAT. §
69-7-6(12) would give the Commission power
to take such affirmative action as is appropriate under all the facts and
circumstances of the case as follows: the transfer, rental, or lease of the
housing that is the subject matter of the complaint; the showing of the
housing that is the subject matter of the compliant where the nature of the
complaint is a refusal to show housing; the making of reports as to the
manner of compliance with the order or orders of the Commission and such
other action as in the judgment of the Commission will effectuate the pur-
poses of this article. The Commission may order such affirmative action as
provided for in this section in the conjunctive, disjunctive, or alternative.
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Assembly. The fifth, a Democrat, is a capable man, but one
who had shown no special interest in fair housing.
- The chairman, former Rep. Bert Gallegos, is a sincere
advocate of fair housing practices, but he lacked muscle as a
Democratic lawmaker and can't have gained much influence,
if any, since switching Republican.
- No strong supporter of the housing act was appointed.
Several were still serving in the Legislature, including the chief
sponsors of the 1959 bill, Sens. George Brown and Bob Allen
of Denver.
- Two Negro members of the committee missed the last
policy session. Their votes might have changed one important
recommendation, decided by a vote of 6 to 5.
- The Colorado Anti-Discrimination Commission, which
has the duty of enforcing the law, was represented in the com-
mittee by an employee, but no one with the official stature of
a commissioner or the CADC director .... 79
While the worth of the Committee's recommendations was
being debated, a newly-elected legislator, Representative Gerald
Kopel of Denver announced that he would introduce his own amend-
ments to the Fair Housing Act which would be more in line with
the amendments sought by the Anti-Distrimination Commission.
When the 1965 General Assembly convened, Senator Donald Kelley
(a member of the Governor's Committee) introduced the committee's
amendments in the Senate" and Representative Kopel introduced his
amendments in the House of Representatives.81
B. Background of the 1965 Amendments: The General Assembly
In January of 1965 most supporters of fair housing felt that
strengthening amendments to the act would be easily passed in the
House of Representatives but that the Senate would be reluctant to
concur in such House action. The feeling was based primarily on
the results of the 1964 election which created a heavy Democratic
majority in the lower chamber but left a five-vote Republican majority
in the upper chamber. The split legislature, as well as the results of
the California referendum on Proposition 14, dimmed the prospect
of any widespread changes in the act.
As introduced, Representative Kopel's bill contained provisions
for expanding coverage to owner-occupied housing (but not com-
mercial space), making violation of the act a misdemeanor, defining
probable cause, providing injunctive power, and establishing as unfair
practices the following: refusal to show, refusal to post Commission
notices, and discharge of an employee for obeying the act. This bill
received the support of the Commission and most civil rights groups
The Denver Post, Dec. 3, 1964, p. 23, col. 1.




in all respects except the provision defining probable cause. The
Commission felt that it could not in every case, before making a
finding of probable cause, investigate and ascertain that the com-
plainant's financial condition would enable him to complete the
transaction complained of.
As predicted, Representative Kopel's bill passed the House easily
and went to the Senate where it bogged down in the Judiciary Com-
mittee, chaired by Senator Kelley, the member of the Governor's
Committee who had introduced the Committee's recommendations in
the Senate. Finally, however, Senator George Brown offered some
compromise amendments, the bill was surprisingly passed by the
Senate with only a few nays, and was ironed out in a conference
committee. Both houses then passed the revised bill and it was
signed by the Governor on April 8th.
C. The Nature of the 1965 Amendments
The 1965 amendments to the Fair Housing Act represent a
compromise which, on balance, is more favorable to the supporters
of fair housing. The final bill omits the penalty provision, passed
by the house, making violation of the act a misdemeanor. Also, the
final bill contains no reference to posting of notices. The bill does
contain a better, but still questionable, definition of probable cause.
On the other hand, the final bill does have a very broad coverage
provision, a procedure for obtaining injunctions, and a provision for
the complainant to secure damages.
The new coverage provision is, in the author's opinion, the
greatest victory achieved by the proponents of fair housing in Colo-
rado. The definition section of the act now provides:
"Housing" shall mean any building, structure, vacant land,
or part thereof during the period it is advertised, listed, or publicly
offered for sale, lease, rent, or transfer of ownership; except that
"housing" shall not include any room or rooms offered for rent
or lease in a single family dwelling maintained and occupied in
part by the owner or lessee as his household.1
2
The legislature removed the original statutory language "intended,
arranged or designed to be used or occupied as the home or residence
of one or more human beings.'"'" Thus the new definition includes
commercial space as well as residential housing. The only housing
beyond the reach of the statute is a room or rooms in a single family
dwelling - the "Mrs. Murphy's Rooming House" exception.
The unfair housing practices section of the act now contains a
provision making unfair the refusal to show housing or the refusal
*COLo. REv. STAT. § 69-7-3 (1)(d) (1963) as amended § 1, H.B. 1021 (1965).
Supra, p. 14.
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"to receive and transmit any bona fide offer to buy, sell, rent, or
lease" and a new provision making it an unfair housing practice
"[f]or any person to discharge, demote, or discriminate in matters
of compensation against any employee or agent because of said
employee's or agent's obedience to the provision of this article.""
A new section has been added to the statute to make effective
the relief to a complainant when the gist of the complaint is a refusal
to show housing:
If the complaint alleging an unfair housing practice relates to
the refusal to show the housing involved, the commission, after
proper investigations as set forth in this section, may issue its
order that the housing involved be shown to the complainant, and
if the respondent refuses without good reason to comply therewith
within three days, then the commission, or any commissioner, may
file a petition pursuant to Section 69-7-7(13). The district court
shall hear such matters at the earliest possible time, and the court
may waive the requirement of security for a petition filed under this
paragraph. If the district court finds that the denial to show is
based upon an unfair housing practice, it shall order the respondent
to immediately show said housing involved and also to make full
disclosure concerning the sale, lease, or rental price and any other
information being then given to the public."
5
Section 69-7-7(13) referred to in the above provision is a new
section stating that "[u]pon refusal by a person to comply with any
order or regulation of the commission, the commission shall have
authority to immediately seek an order in the district court enforcing
the order or regulation of the commission; such proceedings shall
be brought in the district court in the county in which the respondent
resides or transacts business."86
The injunction procedure adopted by the legislature is almost
exactly the same as the one proposed by the Governor's Committee"
with the following additional safeguards:
The district court shall hear matters on the request for an
injunction at the earliest possible time. No restraining order or pre-
liminary injunction shall be issued except upon the giving of
security by the person claiming to be aggrieved in such sum as the
court deems proper for the payment of such costs and damages as
may be incurred or suffered by any party who is found to have
been wrongfully enjoined or restrained. If at any time it shall appear
to the court that security given under this section has become im-
paired or is insufficient, the court may vacate the restraining order
or preliminary injunction unless within such time as the court may
fix the security be made sufficient. A surety upon a bond or under-
taking under the section submits himself to the jurisdiction of the
court and appoints the clerk of the court as his agent upon whom any
papers affecting his liability on the bond or undertaking may be
CoLo. REv. STAT. § 69-7-5 (1)(g) (1963) as amended § 5, H.B. 1021 (1965).
*COLO. REv. STAT. § 69-7-6 (1)(b) (1963) as amended § 6, H.B. 1021 (1965).
mCOLO. REv. STAT. § 69-7-7 (13) (1963) as amended § 7, H.B. 1021 (1965).
sT See text p. 19 supra.
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served. His liability may be enforced on motion without the neces-
sity of an independent action. The motion and such notice of the
motion as the court prescribes may be served on the clerk of the
court who shall forthwith mail copies to the persons giving the
security if their addresses are known.""
The Legislature completely reworked the enforcement section
so that it now reads:
... the commission shall.., issue ... an order requiring such re-
spondent to cease and desist from such unfair housing practice; to
rehire, reinstate, provide back pay to any employee or agent discrimi-
nated against because of his obedience to this article; to make
reports as to the manner of compliance with the order of the com-
mission; and to take affirmative action, including the granting of
financial assistance as provided in Section 69-7-5(1) (c), the show-
ing, sale, transfer, rental, or lease of housing.89
The reference to financial assistance is to provide affirmative relief
to a complainant who was discriminated against in applying for
financial assistance to acquire housing."
A new section was added to the act defining probable cause to
exist
... if upon all the facts and circumstances a person of reasonable
prudence and caution would be warranted in a belief that the
transaction would have proceeded to completion except that an
unfair housing practice of refusal to sell, transfer, rent, or lease
had been committed. As to all other unfair housing practices,
probable cause shall exist if upon all the facts and circumstances a
person of reasonable prudence and caution would be warranted in a
belief that an unfair housing practice has been committed. 91
Provision was made in the new amendments for a complainant
to obtain relief in a separate action for damages occasioned by a
respondent's unfair housing practice. The new section provides:
(1) (a) Any complainant in a separate civil action shall be entitled
to damages if the following facts are established by a preponderance
of evidence:
(b) That the complainant has proceeded pursuant to this article;
(c) That a finding of probable cause has been made by the
commission; and
(d) That the respondent did in fact commit an unfair housing
practice; and
(e) That after the filing of a complaint, but prior to the
issuance of a restraining order, the respondent has transferred,
sold, or rented the subject property; and
(f) That the respondent has failed to comply with the order
or orders of the commission.
(2) The complainant in such action shall be entitled to actual
'COLO. Rav. STAT. § 69-7-6 (6)(d) as amended § 6, H.B. 1021 (1965). This sub-
section (d) should be read in connection with subsections (b) and (c) to reflect the
entire injunction procedure.
'COLO. REv. STAT. § 69-7-6 (12) '(1963) as amended § 6, H.B. 1021 (1965).
'COLo. REv. STAT. § 69-7-5 (1) (c) (1963).
"COLO. REv. STAT. § 69-7-3 (1)(k) (1963) as amended § 2, H.B. 1021 (1965).
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damages, if any, costs incurred in the action, and interest upon
such damages from the date of filing the complaint. The court
may, under appropriate circumstances, require a respondent to sell,
rent, lease, or transfer to complainant housing similar to the housing
which was the subject matter of the complaint.92
Other amendments were made to the 1959 act, mostly technical
amendments to clear up ambiguities in the original act and to tie
in the new amendments with existing provisions.
IV. AN EVALUATION OF THE NEW COLORADO ACT
The 1965 amendments to the Fair Housing Act, as finally
adopted, bear some resemblance to the proposals of the Governor's
Committee in principle. Only the injunction procedure, however,
was taken from the Committee's recommendations and even this
proposal was modified by the Legislature. Although most will agree
that the new act is broader than what the Governor's Committee
envisioned, many aspects of the act present difficult problems of
application and interpretation. These problem areas will be dis-
cussed here.
A. Coverage
Although the new act is very liberal in its coverage provision -
all housing (except rooming houses) covered during the period it is
advertised, listed, or publicly offered for sale - the definition could
create some problems.
By defining housing in terms of when it is on the public market,
the Commission could be faced with serious jurisdictional questions
in cases where evasive devices are employed to keep housing on and
off the market at the owner's will. For example, would the Commis-
sion have juridiction where an owner, seeking to sell his own house
by way of a sign in the front yard, removes the sign as a Negro
family approaches the house and refuses to talk to the would-be
Negro purchaser because the house is no longer on the market?
Or, can the words "advertised, listed, or publicly offered" be evaded
by devices such as advertising only in private publications, i.e.,
church bulletins, fraternal order publications, or by private offerings,
i.e.,. word-of-mouth or privately printed and circulated offerings?
Because, normally, the only way an unfair housing practice
arises is when someone tries to secure housing he believes is available,
perhaps the definition should have omitted the language discussed
above. Certainly the Legislature could rely upon the Commission's
ability to ignore any possible complaint that someone was refused
housing that was not on the market! By writing such a limitation into
"CoLo. REv. STAT. § 69-7-8 (1963) as amended § 8, H.B. 1021 (1965).
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the definition upon which the Commission's jurisdiction is based, the
Legislature has created the danger that some people will seek to
invent evasive devices.
B. The Injunction Procedure
Granting that the Commission has had problems of mootness
caused by respondents who sold the property out from under the
Commission, the injunction procedure provided in the new act will
do little to solve the problem.
Before the injunction procedure can be invoked the Commission
staff must investigate and make a finding of probable cause. Then,
the Commission must review the staff findings and make its own
finding of probable cause. The staff may require several days to
investigate a complaint; the Commission meets monthly. Conse-
quently, as long a period as a month could pass before the Com-
mission is ready to seek an injunction- certainly long enough for
a respondent to dispose of the property.
In addition to the time problem just mentioned, the safeguards
written into the procedure - especially the security provisions-
would discourage most complainants from participating in an in-
junction proceeding. Also, subsection (d), quoted sup-a p. 26,
would discourage any surety from providing the necessary security.
One can safely predict that the injunction procedure will rarely,
if ever, be used. The only possible utility the procedure may have
is its use by the Commission as a threatening tool to be used in
settling complaints by conference, conciliation, or persuasion. How
effective such a tool will be remains to be seen.
C. Probable Cause
The definition of probable cause in the new act has undoubtedly
caused more problems than it solved. No one had ever complained
that the Commission, under the original act, had difficulty in work-
ing with the term. The only real function of the use of the probab!e
cause concept in the act is to enable the investigative staff of the
Commission to ascertain those complaints with sufficient merit to
warrant conciliation efforts or to go to the Commission for hear-
ings. Now the act provides that the investigative staff must find
that the transaction would have gone to completion but for the
alleged unfair practice.
Several problems are created by this provision. First, in the
usual case the complainant never gets to see enough of the house or
apartment to know himself whether or not he would have com-
pleted the transaction. How, then, can an investigator for the Com-
mission make this determination? Second, the respondent may be
1965
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able to rebut a finding of probable cause by showing the complainant
looked at several houses or apartments in addition to the housing
in question! This would hardly be consistent with the purpose of
the act. Third, the definition seems to place upon the Commission
a burden of showing the transaction would have gone to completion
- a burden which would involve the Commission in investigating
the financial resources of every complainant before any hearings
are held.
Probable cause is incapable of definition. The legislature should
not have even attempted a definition for the simple reason that the
question of probable cause is, in housing complaints as in other
areas of the law, merged into the merits of the case. If the investi-
gator decides "no probable cause" the complaint is dismissed, and
the complainant may seek judicial review. On the other hand, if
the investigator to decide the merits of a case before an evidentiary
ciliated) is heard by the Commission whose decision is subject to
judicial review. In other words the probable cause determination is
always safeguarded. In some cases the new definition will compel
the investigator to decide the merits of a case before an evidentiary
hearing! An apt analogy to this ridiculous situation would be a
legislative definition saying "probable cause to issue a search war-
rant shall exist if the magistrate is convinced a crime has been
committed."
Conceivably, the court could find the probable cause deter-
mination to be jurisdictional, and a condition precedent to a hearing.
Such a legislative intent is inconceivable.
D. Civil Relief for Complainant
The new section providing a procedure for a damage suit by
a complainant in district court 3 is unlikely to be effective. Limiting
recovery to actual damages and no provision for attorney's fees makes
it financially unfeasible for a complainant to utilize the procedure
because actual damages would rarely make a suit worthwhile. Fur-
thermore, all the conditions of the suit would rarely be met. For
example, if the Commission did not get an injunction and the
property were sold, the Commission would hardly go through the
expense of a hearing and order with the only relief available a
cease and desist order." The section will probably never be invoked.
V. CONCLUSION
The new amendments, when coupled with the original act,
make the Colorado Fair Housing Act the most comprehensive in




the nation. Despite the problems mentioned above, the act, in
general, is a complete scheme for correcting discriminatory housing
practices.
The power has always rested with the states to provide for the
health, safety and welfare of its citizens. At no time in the history
of the United States was this police power actually and effectively
subordinated to an overriding concept of private property (except,
perhaps, for the short and spotty reign of substantive due process
in economic regulation cases). The use of the police power to pro-
mote equal opportunity in housing is a relatively new step in the
process of affirmative action in the civil rights area and, as experience
with fair housing statutes progresses, new approaches may emerge.
Obviously an act like the Colorado Fair Housing Act cannot
and will not by itself eliminate prejudice or discrimination. Law is
a clumsy tool for changing attitudes. However, if law can change
prejudicial practices, eventually the attitudes underlying the prac-
tices begin to change. This is the real hope of the Fair Housing Act.
No mass movement of Negroes into white neighborhoods will result
because of the act. No minority-group member in Colorado is guar-
anteeed, because of the act, that he will be able to buy a specific
house. The major accomplishment of the fact was perhaps best
expressed by James Reynolds, Director of the Anti-Discrimination
Commission. Mr. Reynolds, a Negro, in talking to a group of
Realtors recently said:
But this law means something entirely different to me than it does
to you. I say that I am a part of this country. I feel the people in
Alabama and Mississippi are not separate from me.
And I say to you -this law just passed is a great thing for
me. It says, in effect, that the people of Colorado are telling me
that I am a part of the community. It says that I am somebody in the
social system in which I live.95
" The Denver Post, May 4, 1965, p. 52, col. 3.
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Automobile Design: Evidence
Catching Up With The Law
By RALPH NADER*
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent years have witnessed the steady decline of doctrinal
obstacles to the liability of manufacturers for harm caused by
defective products.' The resulting expansion of enabling principles
in the area of products liability extends to the theory of negligent
design,' which in turn embraces the potential liability of the auto-
mobile manufacturer for the unsafe design of his product.' Indeed,
the major barrier to recovery under this theory lies not in finding law
to support the doctrine, but rather in ferreting out the existing
evidence in order to make use of the law.
Despite the growth of common law principles facilitating
recovery from manufacturers on theories of negligence, breach of
warranty, and strict tort liability, and despite the great frequency of
vehicular accidents and casualties, there has not been an accompany-
ing development of case law in the automobile design area.' The
fundamental reason is that trial attorneys have assumed far too
long that the blanket responsibility for both accident and injury
*Member, Connecticut and Massachusetts Bars; A.B., Princeton, 1955; LL.B., Harvard
Law School, 1958.
'The three landmark decisions are MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382,
iii N.E. 1050 (1916) (negligence); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32
N.J. 358, 161 A. 2d 69 (1960) (implied warranty) ; Greenman v. Yuba Power
Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 67, 377 P. 2d 897 (1963) (strict liability in tort).
" See Noel, Manufacturer's Negligence of Design or Directions for Use of a Product,
71 YALE L.J. 816 (1962).
See Katz, Liability of Automobile Manufacturers for Unsafe Design of Passenger
Cars, 69 HARV. L.REv. 836 (1956).
Cases holding the manufacturer liable for unsafe vehicle design include Carpini v.
Pittsburgh & Weirton Bus. Co., 216 F. 2d 404 (3d Cir. 1954) (negligent design
of braking system); Goullon v. Ford Motor Co., 44 F. 2d 310 (6th Cir. 1930)
negligent design of tractor steering wheel) ; Hyatt v. Hyster, 106 F. Supp. 676
(S.D.N.Y. 1952) (negligent design of fork lift truck) ; Railway Express Agency v.
Spain, 249 S.W. 2d 644 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952) (negligent design of truck door) ;
Zahn v. Ford Motor Co., 164 F. Supp. 936 (D. Minn. 1958) (negligent design
and/or construction of ashtray). See also Blitzstein v. Ford Motor Co., 288 F. 2d
738 (5th Cir. 1961) which found the distributor liable for failing to inspect an
imported vehicle and warn of design defect leading to dangerous concentration of
gasoline vapor.
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belongs to the driver.' They have neglected the role of the automo-
bile not only as a culpable factor in the accident (the "first colli-
sion"), but also as a direct contributor to the injury (the "second
collision"). While the automobile may not be a primary factor in
all first collisions - the impacting of the car - it is definitely a
primary factor in nearly all of the second collisions - when occu-
pants are thrown against the interior of the vehicle.
The basic reason for this failure of trial attorneys to consider
vehicle design, even when their client has no other prospect for
recovery, can be traced to the fact that automobile products liability
cases involve investigation on two levels distinct in space and time.
First there must be an investigation of the situs of the accident and
second, a gathering of external evidence to show the creation of an
unreasonable risk by the manufacturer through faulty product design.
The latter investigation is seldom effectively undertaken by
plaintiff's counsel. Most counsel are simply unfamiliar with the
sources of engineering information and the techniques of deposing
defendant-manufacturer's employees.' Alertness to this second level
of inquiry leads counsel to a more critical scrutiny and handling of
the first level at the accident scene. It is of the utmost importance,
for example, to maintain custody of the damaged vehicle for identi-
fication of the injurious design and the pattern of injury to the client.
Far too often, the vehicle is towed away to the junk yard or to the
repair shop for resale on the used car market.
In the past two years, there have been solid indications of a
growing recognition of human engineering data and concepts and
their use in the courtroom. A leading authority, Professor Ross A.
McFarland,7 characterizes the role of human engineering in highway
safety in these terms:
Many characteristics of the driver are relevant to highway safety,
'An outstanding and burgeoning exception has been the recent Corvair litigation.
See Ridgeway, Car Design and Public Safety, THE NEW REPUBLIC 9 (Sept. 19,
1964). Over one hundred suits involving Corvairs have been brought throughtout
the nation, and more than thirty of these cases are presently pending in the Los
Angeles, California, Superior Court. Nearly all of these cases allege that the Corvair
(1960 to 1964 models) is designed as an inherently unstable vehicle with hazardous
handling characteristics under conditions of anticipated use. General Motors denies
all allegations of negligence, but it did settle the first Corvair case after three days
of trial in June 1964 for $70,000. Pierini v. General Motors Corp., and Washburn
Chevrolet (Superior Court, Santa Barbara, Calif.). See also, Sekelik v. Ford Motor Co.,
Civil No. 61-464, W.D. Pa. April 1963 (Jury verdict of $25,000 for plaintiff who
claimed negligence in the laminating process leading to breakage of the Fo-Mo-Co glass
in left front door of 1959 Ford). See, Nader, Patent Laws Prime Source to Secure
Safer Auto Design, 1 TRIAL 26 (Dec. 1964). But see note 24 infra.
'Nader, Lawyers Asked to Research Auto Design, NACCA PI&E BULL 13 (April
1963).
Professor of Environmental Safety, School of Public Health, Harvard University.
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but it must be remembered that the vehicle and certain aspects of
the environment are generally more amenable to control than driver
characteristics and in some cases show more promise of immediate
and specific gains in accident reduction. It is in the control of the
vehicle and the driving environment that the human engineer can
make his unique and most important contribution to highway
safety.8
The rapidly developing field of human engineering (or opti-
mum man-machine interaction), sparked by military and space
research and development, is of signal importance to counsel in
automobile products liability cases. Particularly since World War
II's termination and the onset of federal grants for such research,
non-industry scientists, engineers, and physicians have published
materials dealing candidly with the measures for adapting the ve-
hicle to the needs of the driving task and the protection of the
occupants during a collision.' Their findings have opened new
aspects of the manufacturer's duty of care to those affected by his
products. They also illuminate the necessity for more thorough
accident investigation"° - an important part of which is simply the
'McFarland, The Role of Human Engineering in Highway Safety, in HUMAN FACTORS
IN TECHNOLOGY 213 (Bennett, Degan & Spiegel eds. 1963). Other authorities lend
support to this view, e.g.: Research, Report of the President's Committee for Traffic
Safety, 1961, where it is said at p. 19 that a fundamental principle of safety engi-
neering is to "anticipate every type of accident which may occur because of machine
or human failure and then establish safeguards to eliminate the hazard or minimize
the injury when failure occurs."
A leading General motors safety engineer had this to say:
One of the fundamental principles of safety engineering is to anticipate
every possible type of accident which may occur because of mechanical
failure or human failure and then to establish safeguards to minimize the
hazard or injury which may result when such a failure occurs .... Our
predecessors had pioneered in safety engineering by taking fundamental
steps to avoid accidents, but they did not apply the second concept of the
industrial safety engineer, to provide all safeguards in the event that an
accident occurred because of human fallibility.
Kenneth A. Stonex, in TRAFFIC SAFETY RESEARCH REVIEW at p. 18 (National Safety
Council, 1961). This rare expression by an automobile industry spokesman is
strongly directed to improving the safety of occupants in the "second collision."
'See bibliographies in McFarland, id. at 81-85, 228-29, 245-46, 266-67, 282-83. Two
recent and specifically informative papers are: Huelke & Gikas, How Do They Die?
Medical-Engineering Data From On-Scene Investigations of Fatal Automobile Acci-
dents, Society of Automotive Engineers paper 1003A, Jan. 1965; and Patrick, Human
Tolerance to Impact - Basis for Safety Design, Society of Automotive Engineers
Paper 1003B, Jan. 1965. A compilation in abstract form of the Cornell research,
"Abstracts of ACIR Studies 1954 to January 1964," is obtainable from Cornell
Aeronautical Laboratory, P.O. Box 235, Buffalo, New York. A detailed source book
for information on automobile safety is Robb & Philo, LAWYERS DESK REFERENCE
1965, INFORMATION: WHAT TO FIND, WHERE TO FIND IT 1965 (Rochester, N.Y.:
Lawyers Coop. Pub. Co., 1965).
A highly useful and detailed manual for accident investigation and analysis is Baker.
TRAFFIC ACCIDENT INVESTIGATOR'S MANUAL FOR POLICE (The Traffic Institute,
Northwestern University, Evanston, Ill. 1963).
VOL. XLII
AUTOMOBILE DESIGN
attribution of new significance to hitherto neglected or subordinated
facts."
As Professor McFarland notes:
[A]ccident reports generally have failed to identify difficulties in
man-machine integration as accident causes. Design failures may be
so subtle that those responsible for reporting accidents may not be
aware of them, particularly if the personnel are not trained in
human engineering. However, if defects are present, it is only a
matter of time before some driver "fails" and has an accident. 12
The basic obstacle to increased effective use of the concepts of
human engineering in the courtroom is the problem of perfecting
the structure and flow of information to counsel, much as was done
in the post-war period for forensic medicine."
II. THE MUNCY AND MICKLE CASES
Two recent cases handled by small law firms in relatively rural
areas of the country reveal that the problems of access to these evi-
dential requisites are by no means insurmountable.
In Muncy v. General Motors Corp.,4 the plaintiff-pedestrian
was struck by a runaway automobile while she was standing on a
sidewalk. The vehicle had lurched over the curb when a disembark-
ing passenger inadvertently struck the accelerator pedal with her
foot. The driver, prior to alighting, had removed the key from the
ignition thinking that by doing so she had shut off the car's motor.
In the first trial on the merits, plaintiff's emphasis rested on a stuck
Ibid. Consider the following failure to use human engineering, particularly where
there is no clear instruction or warning to the driver:
Owners of many new automobiles were cautioned that under certain cir-
circumstances the "parking brake" on their car might appear firmly set, but
still allow it to roll backwards freely. The Association of Casualty and
Surety Companies advises that this can be especially dangerous if a driver
parks his car in the family driveway, many of which slope. The insurance
organization said this condition arises because of recent changes in the de-
sign of the parking or emergency brake system of nearly all passenger cars
and many light trucks. If the parking brake is set without the simultaneous
application of the hydraulic service (foot) brakes, the bottom of the brake
shoes are brought into contact with the drums on the rear wheels, but the
shoes are not fully engaged. With the parking brake in this condition, the
Association says, the car cannot roll forward, but it can move freely to the
rear. If, on the other hand, the motorist is pressing his foot on the hy-
draulic brake while he is setting the parking brake, the shoe and drum
engage completely and the car will move. As a safety precaution, the
Association urges motorists to get into the habit of applying the foot brake
while they set the parking brake.
Sajety Newsletter, Automotive and Machine Shop Section (Oak Ridge National
Laboratory, Oak Ridge, Tenn., Oct. 1963). This is a condition where, given a
backsliding vehicle and injury, driver "carelessness" can more fundamentally be
analyzed as a product of engineering carelessness.
'2 McFarland, supra note 8, at 215.
'See 2 BELLI, MODERN TRIALS §§ 268-279 (1954).
'*Civil No. 906, E.D. Tex., Marshall Div., April 10, 1964. (An appeal is pending
in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.)
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accelerator claim. It was alleged that this condition was attributable
to General Motors' workmanship. A hung jury led to re-trial of the
case in April, 1964, when the emphasis was shifted to the defective
design of the ignition switch. The complaint against General Motors
alleged improper design of the ignition switch in that it permitted
the withdrawal of the ignition key while the motor of the automo-
bile was running and the vehicle was in gear. This time the jury
returned a verdict against the defendant, General Motors.
Muncy is a graphic example of the use of previously neglected
sources of evidence to establish a case of liability based on the
manufacturers' neglect to consider human engineering in the design
of his products. Plaintiff's counsel proceeded on a fundamental
premise of human engineering - namely that the design of auto-
motive equipment should strive for maximum compatibility with
human motor and perceptual capabilities. 5
Examination of expert witnesses for General Motors produced
admissions that "human factor" (or human engineering) designing
was recognized and that when the automatic transmission was first
installed with this ignition switch design, the precaution was taken
of arranging the gear lever so that the motor could not be started
with the automatic transmission in gear. This was followed by an
admission from the designer of the switch that the danger of one
inadvertently leaving the car in gear with the motor running when
the ignition key was withdrawn was taken into account when the
automatic transmission was put into use (soon after World War II),
but was considered too remote to require a re-design of the switch.
The plaintiff's counsel made advantageous use of patents in
the area of ignition switch design and instrument controls held by
The growing emphasis by accident researchers on the safety engineering responsibility
of the highway system to drivers, whose misjudgment is so often a function of
engineering defects in the vehicle-highway system, is reflected in the following re-
marks by the Federal Highway Administrator:
Perhaps the time has come to examine some of our present safety programs
and some of our present safety concepts. The truth, as I see it, may be
painful.
Accident records as they are now collected show driver failure as the prin-
cipal cause of most traffic accidents. Yet we know that we can and do
design freeways with fine safety records. Isn't this some evidence that
often the driver is not really at fault in an accident? In many cases haven't
we given the driver a task beyond the capacity of his senses, nerves, and
muscles?
We must face up squarely to this premise: the majority of drivers are per-
forming as well as we can reasonably expect, under existing conditions.
From that premise it is logical to reason that the conditions must be changed
- we must improve the road, the vehicle, and the basic control measures
of the system.
Address by Rex M. Whitton, National Safety Congress, Conrad Hilton Hotel, Chi-
cago, Ill., Oct. 28, 1963.
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General Motors and others in presenting his case. Employment of
these patents represented an unprecedented pre-trial and trial tech-
nique in automobile products liability litigation. Not only were they
highly informative as to the "state of the art" and various alterna-
tives in ignition switch design, but they also facilitated locating the
General Motors experts in this field for testimony at trial. Further,
they provided a basis for conducting more thorough examinations
of defendant's employees. Finally, the trial record shows that, over
defense counsel's objections, a General Motors patent was offered
into evidence to show the company's awareness of the need for
anticipation of driver error or miscalculation in the design of con-
trols. This was patent Number 2,929,261 (Charles Chayne, assignor
to General Motors) which states that vehicle controls
must not only be easily operated but also accessible to the operator
with a minimum of inconvenience. Furthermore, safety is a con-
cern since the control must be of the type that an operator would
not inadvertently operate under normal conditions.
While in the Muncy case faulty engineering design was shown
to be the cause of the accident which then led to the injury (the
first collision), the case of Mickle v. Blackmon, Cherokee Const.
Co., and Ford Motor Co."6 was based on the premise that although
the collision between the two cars involved was not the fault of
engineering, the resulting injury (the product of the "second colli-
sion") was. Plaintiff, a 17-year-old girl, was riding in the front seat
of a 1949 Ford. The car entered an intersection and collided with
another vehicle at a speed estimated to have been between twenty
and twenty-five miles per hour. Plaintiff was thrown against the
gear shift lever by the force of the collision. The lever entered her
back just under the left shoulder blade and penetrated her spinal
cord, rendering her a paraplegic. Suit was brought against the driver
of the other vehicle and Ford Motor Co., for unsafe design and
manufacture of the gear shift lever on which plaintiff was impaled.
Plaintiff sought to prove six points in support of her allegation
against Ford that the design of the shift lever was unsafe:
(1) The lever protruded substantially beyond the rim of the
steering wheel - needlessly increasing its potential to injure in the
event of an accident. In support of this the actual steering column
of the vehicle in question was introduced into evidence.
(2) The knob which the defendant installed on the exposed
" Circuit Ct., 6th Judicial Cir., York County, S.C., March 1963.
" It was shown that the bottom half had three supporting braces to a core which held
the ball upon the lever and that the top half was completely hollow. The halves
were adhered together by glue.
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end of the lever did not provide an adequate and safe protective
guard. The knob - a thin, plastic, round ball made in two parts -
was introduced into evidence." Testimony was introduced showing
that in the 1951 Ford, a knob was used that was twice as thick as
the one used in the 1949 model and was made of material which
did not crystallize into fault or craze lines as did the knob used in
1949.18
(3) The method used by Ford to fasten the knob to the gear
shift lever actually facilitated the knob slipping down the lever
when struck. This point was substantiated by the use of an engi-
neering expert, the garageman who kept custody of the vehicle,
and a large photograph.
(4) Ford Motor Co. did not employ a shoulder or collar in
the design of its lever to prevent the knob from sliding down the
rod when struck, leaving the end of the lever exposed and unshielded.
(5) Other automobile manufacturers, in designing their gear
shift levers, did not allow the lever to project so far beyond the rim of
the steering wheel; used threads or splines, in circular grooves, to
secure the protective shield (knobs) on the gear shift lever; and
provided a shoulder or collar to prevent the knob from sliding down
the lever and exposing the end of it.
(6) Experts who testified at the trial were of the opinion that
the design and construction of the gear shift lever and knob by
Ford was unsafe.
The jury returned a verdict against Ford Motor Co. for injury
cause. The driver of the vehicle was exonerated.
III. CONCLUSION
The Mickle case illustrates in detail both the conceptual and
evidential impact of the accident-injury research findings made by
researchers at various universities over the past fifteen years. Indeed,
a chief expert witness for the plaintiff, John 0. Moore, was formerly
director of the Cornell project which for over a decade has col-
lected and analyzed motor vehicle injury statistics from many states
in order to determine the pattern of occupant-injury inside the
vehicle. It has been the Cornell data1" which has pinpointed the
leading instrumentalities of injury in a vehicle. These were found
'Plaintiff referred to Boeing Airplane Co. v. Brown, 291 F. 2d 310 (9th Cir. 1961)
as authority for making the comparison to the later knobs.
Abstracts of ACIR Studies 1954 to January 1964. Leading causes of injury cited by
Cornell are discussed in Hearings Before the Special Subcommittee on Traffic Safety




to be: the steering assembly, the door latch (failure), the instrument
panel, the rearview mirror, the seat anchorage (failure), and the
windshield.
The empirical distinction between accident cause and injury
cause - accidents do not per se cause injuries - adds an entirely
new dimension to the trial of automobile cases. It opens up a vast
area for counsel to present in the courtroom the premises and evi-
dence of human engineering research results. Products liability
doctrine can be viewed as the normative side of human engineering
principles. When the human engineer shows, for example, how it is
possible to build automobiles which are safer in case of accident,
products liability doctrine then measures this feasibility against legal
concepts of duty and standards of care. In addition, as more scien-
tific engineering knowledge is made available, the normative con-
cepts of products liability law are likely to develop with greater
precision and comprehensiveness," Such a maturing process, en-
visaged by the old adage of Roman law - ex facto ius oritur (out
of the fact comes the law) - has been observable in the products
liability cases of the past decade wherein courts have liberalized
the scope of warranty and diminished the citadel of privity.
IV. EPILOGUE
It is significant that the vector of such an evolution points
toward a fulfillment of a basic purpose of tort law - deterrence
of the injurious activity. The deterrence function of tort liability is
now rather soundly debunked by commentators who view it largely
as a myth employed in law school courses to round out a pedagogi-
cal repertory. These writers may be approaching reality insofar as
driver and pedestrian behavior are concerned,"' but that is by no
means the entire picture. A major factor in accidents between auto-
mobiles and between automobiles and pedestrians, is an engineering
accomplishment - the motor vehicle. It appears that decisions ad-
verse to particular engineering designs employed in manufacturing
such vehicles would have a substantial deterrent effect on the manu-
facturers. Let the recent design of the vehicle fin structure illustrate
the point. For a period of several years, beginning in 1957 for
2OSee e.g., Safety-Like-For Humans, Man, PRODUCT ENGINEERING, April 27,
1964, pp. 100-101; Automobile-Tire Safety, 111 CONG. REc. 5717 (daily ed.
March 25, 1965) (Commentary on the unpublished Federal Trade Commission
hearings on tires in January 1965); Campbell, Twenty-Three Fatal Crashes With
Seat Belts, PROCEEDINGS, SEVENTH STAPP CAR CRASH CONFERENCE, (Springfield,
Ill.: Charles Thomas, 1965); CONSUMER REPORTS, April 1965, pp. 168-82; Hear-
ings on Motor Vehicle Safety Before a Subcommittee on Health and Safety, of the
House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 86th Cong. 1st Sess. (1959).
See James & Dickinson, Accident Proneness and Accident Law, 63 HARv. L. REV.
769 (1950).
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most models, automobiles were produced with fins of varying ex-
aggeration with numerous models sporting severely tapered points
upon which many pedestrians have been impaled. It is doubtful that
public buildings could be built anywhere in this country with such
spikes protruding toward passersby. Yet there is no legal bar against
mobile, two-ton machines from being so equipped.22 Were liability
to -be imposed upon manufacturers for the negligent design of these
functionless structures and other projections such as hood ornaments,
it is believed that a remedying change in design would have occurred
much sooner.2
This likelihood stems from the desire of a profit-maximizing
firm to avoid: (1) incurring non-budgeted costs applicable to past
behavior, (2) receiving adverse publicity, and (3) alerting propon-
ents of public regulation to an additional hazard. For the manu-
facturer, the mechanics of the deterrence are much simpler than for
the driver. It is obviously much easier to control the design of a
vehicle than it is to control the behavior of 92 million operators
driving 800 billion miles a year.
' Wakeland, Systematic Automobile Design for Pedestrian Injury Prevention, PRO-
CEEDINGS, FIFTH STAPP AUTOMOTIVE CRASH AND FIELD DEMONSTRATION CON-
FERENCE, September 1961, pp. 193-218 (University of Minnesota, Center for Con-
tinuation Study, 1962).
' In the absence of any company statement, it may be speculated that the increasing
litigation over the Corvair had a role in the decision by General Motors to redesign
the independent rear suspension system in the 1965 models. For a description of
the new design, see '65 Corvairs, SPORTS CAR GRAPHIC, October 1964, pp. 26-29.
This speculation is enforced by the fact that the suspension design in the '65 Corvairs
does not constitute an innovation but was known to the company for many years.
See Patent #3,020,061 held by GM and references contained therein. See also,
CORVAIR PERFORMANCE HANDBOOK (Petersen Publishing Co., Los Angeles, 1963).
See note 5 supra. In the first trial involving the Corvair design, the jury returned a
verdict in favor of General Motors. The plaintiff had alleged that a fatal highway
accident had been caused by defective design of the Corvair's rear-swing axle. Collins
v. General Motors Corp. (Santa Clara County, Calif., Superior Court, Aug. 11, 1965)
in The Denver Post, Aug. 11, 1965, p. 37, col. 5.
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One of the challenging problems facing the modern world has
been the establishment of acceptable international control procedures
to assure that the formidable power of the atom will not be used for
the destruction of mankind but will serve exclusively peaceful
purposes.
Since the setting up of a world-wide authority with powers to
ensure nuclear disarmament in an ideologically and politically
divided world has met with endless impediments, many Western
policy-makers have focused their attention on efforts to ensure that
foreign nuclear assistance earmarked for peaceful purposes will not
be diverted to military use. They have hoped that this procedure
would not only be likely to slow down the tempo of proliferation of
nuclear arms but, at the same time, might also constitute a useful step
in the direction of a system of internationally executed nuclear arms
control or disarmament.
In establishing international (foreign) control procedures over
the peaceful uses of atomic energy, the major Western powers, led
by the United States, would have preferred the multilateral route
over the bilateral approach. However, shortly after the initiation of
President Eisenhower's Atoms-for-Peace program, it became obvious
that the establishment of the proposed International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) had a long way to go.' Thus the atomically ad-
vanced nations of the West decided to go ahead with the conclusion
of bilateral agreements incorporating provisions for safeguards to
ensure exclusively peaceful utilization of their atomic assistance to
other countries.
This article is the outgrowth of a study and on-the-spot survey
sponsored by the American Society of International Law involving
international procedures and techniques developed to control the
t The author gratefully acknowledges the generous support and counsel obtained from
the American Society of International Law and its Advisory Group. For the text of the
article, including the views advanced therein, the responsibility re6ts with the author.
* Professor of Law, University of Denver.
1 See Gorove, "Humanizing the Atom: Establishment of the International Atomic
Energy Agency," 3 N.Y.L.F. 245 at 246 ff. '(1957).
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peaceful uses of atomic energy. It discusses the control provisions
of Canadian bilateral agreements which are, in many ways, typical of
those concluded by Western nations.
The pattern of variables exhibited by the safeguards provisions
of the Canadian bilaterals may conveniently be analyzed in terms of
the objectives, methods, transfer, and sanctions of the control system.
Generally, the respective provisions bear strong similarity to many
bilateral agreements concluded by the United States and Great
Britain, respectively, with other nations. This is in no way surprising
since Washington, London, and Ottawa 'held several consultations to
bring their safeguards procedures into general harmony not only
among themselves but also with respect to the proposed control sys-
tem of the IAEA in order to facilitate any future transfer of safe-
guards functions to that body.'
I. OBJECTIVES AND SCOPE OF CONTROL
The over-all purpose of control under the Canadian bilaterals
is to assure exclusively peaceful uses or "nondiversion" to military
purpose (principle of "nondiversion") and, in line with this, to
prevent unauthorized transfer (principle of "nontransfer") .3
While there is no definition of the meaning of "peaceful" in
contradistinction to "military" uses, military utilization would natu-
rally include use for atomic weapons. Under the Agreement of
December 11, 1957, with Germany, nondiversion is pledged by both
contracting parties4 and the same holds true under the terms of the
Agreement of December 6, 1963, with India.' But whereas under the
former the pledge extends to "identified materials"' (though not to
information or unidentified materials, equipment, and facilities)
supplied under the agreement,7 by terms of the latter it extends only
to fissionable materials produced in the respective power stations of
the two countries.'
2 The U.S. Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of State have persistently
sought agreement from the other major powers supplying nuclear assistance to retain
and implement safeguards rights in their bilateral agreements in a way compatible
with the U.S. and IAEA systems. For details, see 3 McKinney and others Review of
the International Atomic Policies and Programs of the United States, REPORT TO THE
JOINT CoMMITTEE ON ATOMIC ENERGY, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., 851 (1960).
3 See, for instance, Agreements with: Australia, August 4, 1959 (391 U.N.T.S. 192),
Arts. 111(a), IV.1; Germany, Dec. 11, 1957 (Canada Treaty Ser. No. 29, 1957),
Arts. III.A, IV.A; Pakistan, May 14, 1959 (425 U.N.T.S. 130), Arts. III(a), IV.1.
4 Art. IV.l.
5 Art. IX (Canada Treaty Ser. No. 10, 1963).
6 "Identified material" means material (source material or special nuclear material or
fuel) supplied under the Agreement, or special nuclear material derived from the use
of such supplied material or produced in a nuclear reactor obtained pursuant to the





Under the agreement with Germany, the principle of nontrans-
fer applies to both contracting parties and, in essence, signifies a ban
on transfer to international organizations, or to third governments
or to enterprises or individuals under the jurisdiction of third govern-
ments, unless the particular transfer is authorized.' Such authoriza-
tion, however, is implied with respect to information, equipment
(other than nuclear reactors), facilities, and materials supplied under
the agreement, unless otherwise stipulated by the other party."0 With
respect to identified material after irradiation, there is no implied
authorization, and any transfer of such to a third party for chemical
processing or storage is subject to the prior written authorization of
the supplying party." While in the agreement with India nontransfer
is pledged by both parties, it covers only nuclear materials used or
produced in the nuclear power stations specified in the accord.' 2 The
Agreement of July 2, 1959, with Japan," indicates further variations.
By its terms, information obtained by either party may be transferred
to a third party, unless otherwise specified at or before the time of
supply. 4 The agreement further provides that, unless otherwise speci-
fied by the supplying party at or before the time of supply, materials,
equipment, and identified material may be transferred to govern-
mental enterprises of the receiving party and to persons under its
jurisdiction subject, however, to the specific authorization by the
recipient party. Equipment, other than nuclear reactors and materials
obtained under the agreement, may be transferred beyond the juris-
diction of the recipient party unless otherwise specified by the sup-
plier at or before the time of the initial delivery. Identified materials
and nuclear reactors, however, may not be transferred beyond the
jurisdiction of the recipient country without the prior consent of the
supplying party.'"
In addition to, and in line with, the major control objectives of
nondiversion and nontransfer, some Canadian bilaterals also purport
to accomplish certain lesser aims. For example, the agreement with
Japan assures the supplying party option to purchase, for use for
peaceful purposes only, any quantity of excess special nuclear ma-
terial which has been derived from the use of identified material and
is not needed for use by the recipient party. In addition, the
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precautions with which identified material is to be guarded. The
same bilateral also aims to ensure nonprocessing or nonalteration
in form or content of irradiated materials unless written authorization
has been given by the supplying party.' This is a very important
provision since it is normally after chemical processing or other
alteration that irradiated materials become most susceptible to
diversion.
II. ROUTINE CONTROL METHODS
Most of the Canadian bilaterals, not including those concluded
with the United States and Great Britain, confer certain "safeguards
rights" on the supplying country (or countries if both are suppliers)
in order to enable such country to assure itself that the supplied
material or equipment, or source or special fissionable material
derived therefrom, is used solely for peaceful purposes.
The regular methods of control are most elaborate under com-
prehensive agreements involving substantial nuclear assistance where
the danger of diversion for military use is great. In such case, the
various types of safeguards include the right to examine the design
of equipment and facilities, to require appropriate record-keeping
and accounting procedures, as well as submission of reports, to
designate representatives who are to have access to all places and
data as necessary for material accountability and determination of
compliance with nondiversion, to approve the means to be used for
chemical processing, and to require notification regarding disposition
of nuclear materials.
The actual control functions are carried out by the designated
representatives of the Canadian government on the territory of the
assisted country or by other atomic energy personnel of Canada on
Canadian soil." If the bilateral agreement accords similar safe-
guards rights to a foreign country from which Canada receives
assistance, such safeguards rights are exercised in an identical fashion
by the designated representatives of the respective foreign country.
A. Examination of Design
Under the comprehensive bilaterals, the supplying country has
the right to examine the design of equipment and facilities, including
1-6 Art. IIll(c) (d).
17 See, for instance, Agreements with: Australia, Art. IV.1; Germany, Art. IV.I;
Pakistan, Art. IV.1.
18 The Canadian Atomic Energy Control Act of 1946 (10 George VI, Ch. 37) was
superseded by a later Act of 1952 (R.S.C. 1952, Ch. 11, as amended by 1953-4, Ch.
47) which established an Atomic Energy Control Board. Under Sec. 9(f) of the Act,
the Board is authorized, subject to the approval of the Governor in Council, to
make regulations "governing co-operation and the maintenance of contact, through
international organizations or otherwise, with scientists in other countries or with
other countries with respect to the production, use, application and control of, and
research and investigations with respect to, atomic energy."
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nuclear reactors, which are made available under the agreement or
in which any material supplied or any special nuclear material
derived from the use of such material or equipment is to be em-
ployed or processed. Such information is a "must" for the control
body if the supervision is to be exercised in a meaningful manner,
especially in connection with the evaluation or verification of records
(power charts, etc.) and reports. However, it should be emphasized
that the right of examination and subsequent approval relates only
to the question of assuring that the design will not further any
military purpose and that it will permit the effective application of
the provisions of the agreement.1"
The recent bilateral between Canada and India shows an inter-
esting variation from the usual pattern as it is much more specific.
By the terms of that agreement, Canada pledges to provide the
necessary information and design, with detailed drawings and speci-
fications, of a planned atomic power station in India, up to and
including the steam raising equipment. India, on the other hand,
undertakes to provide the design and detailed drawings of the part
of the station beyond the steam raising equipment, services, and
buildings." In addition, both countries pledge to exchange informa-
tion on a continuing basis with regard to the design, construction,
operation, and use of their respective atomic power stations, research,
and development related thereto.2
B. Records and Reports
As a rule, under the comprehensive agreements the recipient
government pledges that an accurate record will be kept at all times
of the source and special nuclear materials derived from the use
of materials or equipment supplied pursuant to the agreement. In
addition, the recipient country agrees to make such records available
to the authorities of the supplying country and to submit periodic
reports based upon them. 2
Under the recent bilateral between Canada and India, both
governments agree to establish an adequate system of records to
ensure accountability for all fuel and fissionable material on the
premises of their respective nuclear power stations and to exchange
quarterly reports and special reports in the event of special circum-
stances at the request of either government, regarding the operation
19 See, for instance, Agreements with: Germany, Art. IV.1(a); Japan, Art. IV.I(a).
20 Arts. III and IV.
2] Art. VIII.
22 See, for example, Agreements with: Germany, Art. IV. I(b) and (c); Japan, Art.
IV.l(b) and (c).
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of their respective nuclear power stations. The reports are to
contain such details as may be reasonably requested by the recipient
country.2"
C. Inspection
One of the most crucial requisites of a meaningful control
system aiming to ensure the peaceful uses of atomic energy is on-the-
spot inspection. For this reason, the supplying country is given the
right to appoint representatives (inspectors) who are to have access
at all times to all places, equipment, and facilities where identified
material is used or located, to all data relating to such identified
material, and to all persons who, by reason of their occupation, deal
with such identified material or such data. The appointment of
representatives, however, may be made only after consultation with
the recipient government which clearly indicates a two-way process
rather than a unilateral imposition. The recipient state is normally
notified in advance of the proposed visit by the foreign inspectors
who are to be accompanied- upon either party's request-by
representatives of the receiving country, provided that they are not
thereby delayed or otherwise impeded in the exercise of their
functions. The access is to be assured to the extent as may be neces-
sary to account for all identified material and to determine whether
such identified material is being used for peaceful purposes only.2"
Normally, the inspectors carry out their control functions by verifi-
cation and audit of records and reports, by comparisons, physical
and accounting checks, sampling, measurement, and through the use
of other devices and procedures that may be necessary for the accom-
plishment of the safeguards objectives.
Slightly more circumscribed stipulations may be found in the
earlier noted agreement between Canada and India which provides
that designated technical representatives of the two governments
are to maintain close contact and, whenever such representatives of
either government so request, they are to be accorded access to all
parts of the atomic power stations and to all other places where fuel
or fissionable material used in or produced by the station (or an
equivalent amount thereof) is being used, stored, or located. They
are also to have access to the appropriate persons and the relevant
data, including nuclear fuel records. Furthermore, they are entitled
to make such observations and measurements of fuel and fissionable
material as are relevant to the purposes of the agreement. How-
23 Arts. XII and XIV.




ever such observations and measurements are to be kept to the mini-
mum consistent with the accomplishment of these purposes. "
D. Chemical Processing and Disposition
With respect to the already mentioned vital area of chemical
processing, most bilaterals provide that each party may satisfy itself
that the means to be used for such processing of identified material
after irradiation will not lend themselves to diversion to military
use.2 1 It may also be noted that the agreement with India provides
for advance notification regarding the disposition, after removal
from the respective nuclear power station, of any fuel and fissionable
material produced therein. 7
III. TRANSFER OF CONTROL TO AN INTERNATIONAL AGENCY
Canadian bilaterals, much as their U.S. and U.K. counterparts,
envisaged the possible transfer of control rights and obligations to
the IAEA. Bilaterals which were entered into prior to the adoption
by the agency of its safeguards system required consultations between
the parties at or after the time the IAEA was in a position to carry
out its safeguards functions. The purpose of such consultations was
to determine whether, and to what extent, the governments wished
to modify the bilateral control stipulations so that they would con-
form more closely with the safeguards provisions of the IAEA and
to decide whether the parties wished to transfer the safeguards
functions to the agency."5
The recent agreement with India is less specific with respect to
transfer and provides only that the two governments will consult
with each other from time to time to determine in what respect and
to what extent they desire to "avail themselves of the services" of the
IAEA in reference to the bilateral.29
Although all the Canadian bilaterals have been concluded with
friendly nations, most of them carry provisions for certain sanctions.
For instance, under the agreement between Canada and Germany,
both parties have the right to apply sanctions in case it is determined
by either party that identified material is furthering a military
purpose. In such case the party making such determination has the
25 Art. XIII.
26 Agreements with: Australia, Art. IV. (d); Germany, Art. IV.i (4); Japan, Art.
IV(c); Pakistan, Art. IV.f(d).
2 7 Art. XI.
28 See, for instance, Agreements with: Australia, Art. IV.2; Pakistan, Art. IV.2. It
may be noted that the IAEA, Japan and the United States signed an Agreement on
September 23, 1963 (14 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 1265), providing for the application of
safeguards by the Agency to the bilateral accord between the two States. Similar
action may be taken in regard to the Canadian bilaterals.
2 9 Art. XV.
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right to suspend or cancel scheduled delivery of source material,
special nuclear material and fuel, and to require the return of all
identified material under the control of the other party.3" A slightly
smoother approach is taken by the agreement with Japan, which
provides that the party making the determination may, before exer-
cising the right of suspension or cancellation and before demanding
return, call upon the other contracting party to take corrective steps.3
In the bilaterals, there is no machinery provided for arbitration
or judicial or any other settlement of a dispute arising out of non-
compliance or otherwise. The bilateral with India goes even further
by omitting any reference to sanctions and stating simply that the
agreement reflects the "special relations and long standing coopera-
tion" between the two countries in the peaceful uses of atomic
energy."
Finally, in order to protect the interests of the cooperating
nation and to allay possible fears regarding the disclosure of
technological know-how and industrial secret or other confidential
information, some bilaterals provide that representatives and other
officials under the jurisdiction of either contracting party, who, by
reason of their official duties, acquire such secret information, may
not disclose such information." The penalty for unauthorized
disclosure in such case is determined by domestic law.
V. CONCLUSION
The preceding safeguards procedures established by Canadian
bilateral agreements over the peaceful uses of atomic energy are
instructive inasmuch as they reveal a pattern of minimal requisites
thought to be essential for the application of effective control. 4
While all the safeguards represent, one way or another, some
burden and constitute an intrusion into domestic affairs, many of
them, especially the requirements for the maintenance of records
and the submission of reports, do not necessarily involve much extra
work, since they would normally be required by any efficient man-
agement as well as by the domestic control organs.
Undoubtedly, the most significant safeguard and the most cru-
cial test of the ultimate effectiveness of the control system is on-site




33 See Agreements with: Germany, Art. IV.2; Japan, Art. IV.2.
34 On the meaning of "effective control," see McDoUGAL AND FELICIANO, LAW AND
MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 277 (1961).
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inspection. Limited as this is in regard to its over-all purpose and
application, it must nonetheless be viewed as a vital breakthrough
in the formerly "impregnable" wall of sovereignty.3 5 The last-
mentioned fact, however, should in no way cause us to underestimate
national defense and security considerations which are likely to
continue to be the most powerful impediments in the way of an
extension of the "atoms-for-peace" inspection and control systems
to the all-important area of nuclear arms control and disarmament."
The ultimate value of the Canadian bilateral atomic control
program, like that of its U.S. and U.K. counterparts, lies not only in
the experience gained from its establishment and operation but also
in the fact that it has helped to make foreign supervision and on-the-
spot inspection on a reciprocal basis an accepted standard procedure
with respect to several countries. This surely seems to be a step in
the right direction.
35 See GOROVE, International Securtty Controls: From the Atom to Cosmic Space,
PRoc. 6TH COLL. ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 3 '(Paris, 1963).
36 GOROVE, Lessons From the Control of the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy in
Euratom. PROC. AM. SOC. INT'L LAW 136 at 139 (1964); cf. also GOROVE, Con-
trols Over Atoms, N.Y. Times, March 22, 1964, Sec. E., p. 8.
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Recent Colorado Decisions
WILLS - COLORADO'S FIRST DEVISE By IMPLICATION. Spathariotis
v. Estate of Spathas, 398 P.2d 39 (Colo. 1965).
John Spathas, by his last will and testament, provided that if
his wife should survive him, his non-business property should go
outright to her and his business property should go to a trustee, to
pay the income to his wife for life but with no provision for the
remainder. The will further provided, "In the event that my wife
shall predecease me then I devise ... all my property . . . to the...
Bank ... in trust.., to pay the... income... to my nephew ... for
... twenty years ... [and then to] distribute to the. . . issue of my
nephew...."
The wife did not predecease the testator; yet the court held that
even though the express trust in favor of the nephew failed, a devise
to the nephew and his issue of the remainder of the trust for the
wife was effectively created by implication.1
The court insisted that, "In so holding we are not making a new
will but 'merely giving effect to testamentary intention limited to
language within the four corners of the will'." The opinion was
based upon the proposition that, "If ... the property ... claimed to
be... devised by implication, in a contingency which has occurred,
has been made the subject of an express ... devise in another con-
tingency, which did not occur, then effect may be given to such...
devise by implication, in the contingency which did occur, if a read-
ing of the entire will makes manifest that such was the intention of
the testator." 2
No reliance was placed upon the frequently used presumption
against partial intestacy, although the facts would have made that
argument appropriate.' The case therefore may be taken as strongly
indicating that the court would not be reluctant to resort to implica-
tion in order to salvage poorly drawn deeds as well as wills.'
'Spathariotis v. Estate of Spatha, 398 P.2d 39, 45 (Colo. 1965).
Id. at 44.
'The wife contended that in the contingency which did occur, there was no devise,
express or implied, of the remainder interest in the business property, and that it
should pass by intestate laws. 398 P.2d at 41.
'Brock v. Hall, 33 Cal. 2d 885, 206 P.2d 360 (1949), holds "that implied gifts
may be raised in both wills and inter vivos transfers in trust," and relies, inter alia,
upon RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 115, Comment a., and § 272 (1936). See also,
Implication of gift in inter vivos instrument, Annot. 11 A.L.R. 2d 681 (1949).
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The opinion is strong, sophisticated, and orthodox, and could
have been made even more convincing by the inclusion of some
additional material from the briefs. The only occasion for this com-
ment is afforded by the remark that, "A 'devise by implication' is a
well-rec6gnized concept in the general field of will construction,
though Colorado authority bearing on this point is quite limited."5
It may therefore be of some interest to bring to mind some situations,
other than those mentioned by the court, in which remainders will
usually be implied.
"Blackacre to A and B for their lives, as tenants in common,
and upon the death of the survivor, to C and his heirs." Suppose
that A dies first. Who then is entitled to the possession of his
undivided one-half interest? Not C, because his remainder will be-
come possessory only upon the death of B. B cannot claim the
interest of A by right of survivorship because he and A were not
joint tenants, and yet B will probably take, as the owner of an implied
cross-remainder. The normal construction in such cases is to say
that as to one undivided half A has an estate in possession for his
own life, B has an implied remainder for his own life, and C has a
remainder in fee simple absolute; as to the other half B has an
estate in possession for his own life, A has an implied remainder for
his own life, and C has a remainder in fee simple absolute; and all
of the remainders are vested, though of course, one or the other of
the implied cross-remainders is bound to come to an end before it
becomes possessory.
"Blackacre to A for life, and if no children survive him, then
to B and his heirs." What if a child of A does survive him? It is
usually held that the child had a remainder in fee simple, by implica-
tion.7 If the implied remainder in fee simple absolute were con-
tingent upon the child surviving A, then B would have an alternative
contingent remainder in fee simple absolute; if the implied remainder
in fee simple were vested, subject to divestment by no child surviving
A, then B would have a shifting executory interest in fee simple
absolute.
"Blackacre to A for life, and then to such of his children as he
'Spathariotis v. Estate of Spatha, 398 P.2d 39, 41 (Colo. 1965).
'Hartford National Bank and Trust Company v. Harvey, 143 Conn. 233, 121 A.2d 276
(1956). See also, Disposition of decedent's share of income or property during
interval between deaths of life beneficiaries sharing therein, where remainder was
given over after death of all life benficiaries, Annot. 71 A.L.R. 2d 1332 (1960). See
also, RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 115 (1936).
'Shepherd v. Peratino, 182 F.2d 384 (D.C. Cir. 1950). See also, Gift to issue, chil-
dren, wife, etc., as implied from a provision over in default of such persons, Annot.
22 A.L.R.2d 177 (1952). See also RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 272 (1940).
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may by deed or will appoint." There is no express gift in default of
appointment. If A dies without having exercised the power, there
will be found, according to one line of authority, an implied gift in
fee simple to the objects of the power, vested, in this case in the
children of A, subject to divestment only by the exercise of the
power.' Upon the death of A the power of course ends, and the fee
simple becomes absolute.
These orthodox instances of gifts by implication are especially
interesting by way of contrast to those equally orthodox cases which
hold that a mistaken description may be stricken from a will, but that
the correct description may not be added. In the case which is the
subject of this comment, all of the provisions of a somewhat com-
plicated trust were added, by implication.
Thompson G. Marsh*
CRMINAL LAW - CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS - INDISCRIM-
INATE EXCLUSION OF PUBLIC ATTENDANCE AT A CRIMINAL
TRIAL DENIES THE DEFENDANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO
PUBLIC TRIAL. Thompson v. People, 399 P.2d 766 (Colo. 1965).
In a trial for forcible rape, the prosecutor, before the jury was
impaneled, moved to exclude all spectators who had "no legitimate
purpose" in the courtroom. He contended that the trial would involve
detailed testimony concerning female sexual organs, removal of
clothing of the prosecutrix, and four-letter obscenities uttered during
the alleged offense. Over defense objection, the court, remarking on
the number of younger people in attendance, granted the motion. The
order excluded the public generally, including friends of the defend-
ant, but excepted relatives within the third degree of both the prose-
cutrix and the defendant, the press, all court officials, necessary police
officers, bailiff, and attorneys. The Supreme Court of Colorado
reversed the ensuing conviction, holding that the defendant had been
'Bridgewater v. Turner, 161 Tenn. 111, 29 S.W.2d 659 (1930). This is a very strong
case which seems to provide an exception to the statement by Simes and Smith,
"It is believed that so far no reported case, either American or English, has been
decided which tests absolutely the question whether the court is applying a trust
theory or an implied gift theory." FUTURE INTERESTS § 1033 at 504 (2d ed. 1956).
Here title to a portion of the property was decreed to be in the heirs of an object of
the power who had died before the donee. This result could only be reached by
the theory of implied gift, and the court expressly adopted that theory.
*Professor of Law, University of Denver College of Law.
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denied his constitutional right to a public trial under Article 2 of
the Constitution of Colorado.'
The constitutional guarantees, both federal and state, of a public
trial originate in the English common law, although the derivation
apparently has escaped identification with any particular moment in
English jurisprudence.' Neither common law commentators (e.g.,
Coke and Fortescue) nor early charters of liberty (e.g., Magna Carta
and the English Bill of Rights of 1689) use the exact wording "public
trial" or "speedy and public trial." Nevertheless the general under-
standing is that a public trial was a common law privilege.' Its
development in England may well have sprung from a popular re-
vulsion to the secrecy and tortures of the Inquisition, and the abuses
to criminal process in the French lettre de cachet.4
The salutary effects5 of a public trial - i.e., one with spectators,
interested or not, free to come and go at will - seem to be ideally
that: it produces in the witness' mind a disinclination to falsify by
stimulating the instinctive responsibility to public opinon as symbol-
COLO. CONST. art. 2, §16. "In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the
right to ... a speedy public trial by an impartial jury .... ." The Supreme Court of
Colorado adopted without reservation, 399 P.2d at 781-82, the opinion of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in United States v. Kobli, 172 F.2d 919
(3d Cir. 1949):
"... [T] he Sixth Amendment precludes the general indiscriminate exclusion
of the public from the trial of a criminal case . . .over the objection of the
defendant and limits the trial judge to the exclusion of those persons or
classes of persons only whose particular exclusion is justified by lack of
space or for reasons particularly applicable to them. Moreover whatever may
have been the view in an earlier and more formally modest age, we think
that the franker and more realistic attitude of the present day toward matters
of sex precludes a determination that all members of the public, the mature
and experienced as well as the immature and impressionable, may reasonably
be excluded from the trial of a sexual offense upon the ground of public
morals. 172 F.2d at 923-24.
'Radin, The Right to a Public Trial, 6 TEMP. L.Q. 381-84 (1932). See also 1 BisHop,
NEw CRIMI AL PROCEDURE § 957 (4th ed. 1895) ; Re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 266-72
and notes, an extensive collection of cases and judicial, statutory, and historical sources
on public trial.
'See Radin, supra note 2, at 382. Professor Radin notes at page 382 of this article
that Sir Thomas Smith, who wrote his De Republica Anglorum in 1565, nearly a
century after Fortescue, does make a particular point of the public character of English
trials. As early as 1649, the demand was made, in an English treason trial, for a public
proceeding, and apparently was granted. Trial of John Lilburne, 4 Corbett's St. Tr.
1270, 1273-74 (Comm'n of Oyer and Terminer 1649):
Lt. Col. Lilburne: "[B]y the laws of this land all courts of justice always
ought to be free and open for all sorts of peaceable people to see, behold and
hear, and have free access unto; and no man whatsoever ought to be tried in
holes or corners. . . .But if I be denied this undoubted privilege, I shall
rather die here than proceed any further ......
Judge Keble: "Mr. Lilburne, look behind you and see whether the door
open or no.
Lt. Col. Lilburne: "Well then, Sir, I am satisfied as to that . "
Radin, supra n. 3, at 388-89.
'Summarized in 6 WIGMORE, EviDENCE § 1834 at 332-37 (3d ed. 1940).
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ized in the audience, and objectively, it secures the presence of those
who may be able to furnish testimony or contradict falsehood;'
publicizing the trial by the news media invites testimony or contradic-
tion to false testimony; 7 it produces a wholesome effect upon the
officers of the court in performance of their duty with restraint and
absence of bias, and instills in the public respect for and confidence
in the law and judicial procedure.8 Courts generally agree, however,
that the right to public trial is subject to certain limitations? The
defendant is not deprived of his right if the court limits attendance
'E.g., Tanksley v. United States, 145 F.2d 58, 59 (9th Cir. 1944). See also BLACK-
STONE, COMMENTARIES at 1983 (Jones ed. 1916):
The open examination of witnesses viva voce, in the presence of all man-
kind, is much more conducive to the clearing up of truth than the private
and secret examination before an officer or his clerk, in the ecclesiastical
courts and all that have borrowed their procedure from the civil law: When a
witness may frequently depose that in private that he will be ashamed to
testify in a public and solemn tribunal.
'Re Hearings Concerning Canon 35, 296 P.2d 465, 467, 469-70 (Colo. 1956); New
York Post Corp. v. Leibowitz, 2 N.Y.2d 677, 163 N.Y.S.2d 409, 143 N.E.2d 256,
258, 259-60 '(1958) ; and see 6 Wigmore, supra n. 5, at 333-34; People v. Jelke, 130
N.Y.S.2d 662, 680-81, ajj'd, 308 N.Y. 56, 123 N.E.2d 769 (1954). To be distin-
guished, of course, is the clear right of a criminal defendant to waive his right to a
public trial. E.g., United States v. Sorrentino, 175 F.2d 721, 723 (3rd Cir. 1949);
Gibson v. United States, 31 F.2d 19, 22 (9th Cir. 1929); Keddington v. State, 19
Ariz. 457, 172 Pac. 273, 275 (1918) ; Dutton v. State, 123 Md. 373, 91 Atl. 417, 423
(1914). And see the recent Supreme Court decision holding that the telecasting of a
two-day pretrial hearing, the opening and closing arguments of the State, the return
of the jury's verdict and its receipt by the trial court constituted deprivation of due
process under the Fourteenth Amendment. Estes v. State, 85 Sup. Ct. 1628, 1629, 1632-
33 (1965). The opinion of Clark, J., discusses closely, at 1634-36, the potential of
prejudice to a defendant in the impact of television upon jurors and witnesses in both
original trial and a retrial.
'E.g., Re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 270 (1947) (dictum); People v. Murray, 89 Mich.
276, 50 N.W. 995, 998 (1891) ; State v. Keeler, 52 Mont. 205, 156 Pac. 1080, 1083-
84 (1916).
The Estes decision, announced June 7, 1965, evoked immediate action by the
Supreme Court of Colorado, the only State besides Texas which permitted photo-
graphs and broadcasting in court during the course of a criminal trial. Canon 35,
Canons of Judicial Ethics, Appendix B to Rules of Civil Procedure, COLO. REV.
STAT. (1963). The Colorado court, on July 1, 1965, amended its Canon 35 to
prohibit photographing or broadcasting or televising of any portion of a criminal case,
beginning with the selection of the jury and continuing until submission of the issues
to the jury, ". . . unless all accused persons who are then on trial shall affirmatively
give their consent; . . ." The Canon retains, of course, the requirement of the trial
court's permission to photograph or broadcast. The court expressly attributed the
amendment to the Estes decision, stating that it wished to avoid the possibility that
the Supreme Court of the United States might reverse judgments of conviction on the
ground that the presence of a camera or microphone in a courtroom deprived an
accused person of a fair trial. It concluded,
We make the change without reference to our own views on the subject.
The amendment is made solely for the purpose of avoiding expensive retrials
of criminal cases and the delays in ultimate justice which are caused thereby.
Nothing in this statement shall be construed as a requirement that
persons who have already been tried under the old rule must be granted a
rehearing.
STATEMENT OF THE COURT RE AMENDMENT OF CANON 35, en banc,
Promulgated July 1, 1965.
'1 COOLEY. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 647 (8th ed. 1927).
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to prevent overcrowding.' Conduct in the courtroom which inter-
feres, or threatens to interfere, with the administration of justice may
be met by an exclusion order." Indeed, the court may even screen
or search or issue passes to incoming spectators if it reasonably
apprehends that some intend to interfere with or frustrate justice."
The court may exclude those of tender years because of the imminence
of indecent, scandalous, disgusting, or immoral matters in evidence,
in order to prevent the corruption of young minds." The court may
even be temporarily cleared of some or all the spectators because
of the tender age, severe embarrassment, or emotional disturbance
"°E.g., United States v. Kobli, 172 F.2d 919, 922 (3d Cir. 1949); Davis v. United
States, 247 Fed. 394, 395 (8th Cir. 1917) ; Murray v. State, 202 Miss. 855, 33 So. 2d
291, 292-93, cert. denied, 333 U.S. 959, 869 (1948) (a case in which spectators of
same race as defendant were required to sit in the balcony when their presence on
main floor was barred by segregation as well as overcrowding; the court held that any
complaint on the seating arrangement must come not from the defendant, but from
those who considered the order a denial of equal protection of the laws) ; People v.
Jelke, 308 N.Y. 56, 123 N.E.2d 769, 772, 48 A.L.R.2d 1425, aff d, 130 N.Y.S.2d 662
(1954); Commonwealth ex rel. Paylor v. Cavell, 138 A.2d 246, 249 (Pa. Super.
1958) ; State v. Collins, 50 Wash.2d 740, 314 P.2d 660, 663 (1957).
" E.g., United States v. Kobli, supra note 10, at 922 (spectators must observe "proper
decorum," and if their conduct tends in any way to interfere with the administration
of justice in the courtroom, they may be removed without violating the defendant's
constitutional guarantee of "public trial") ; People v. Jelke, supra note 10, at 772
(it is the "inherent power" of the court) ; Grimmett v. State, 22 Tex. App. 36, 2 S.W.
631, 633-34 (1886) ; State v. Collins, supra note 10, at 663.
2 E.g., People v. Santo, 43 Cal.2d 319, 273 P.2d 249, 256 (1954), cert. denied 348 U.S.
959 (1955) (it was the trial judge's duty to see that no conduct on the part of any
person obstructed justice at a murder trial highly sensationalized in the news media,
and the presence of armed policemen in the courtroom and a search of arriving specta-
tors outside the courtroom, unknown to the jury, did not prejudice the defendant) ;
Pierpont v. State, 49 Ohio App. 77, 195 N.E. 264, 267-68, petition in error dismissed
128 Ohio St. 572, 192 N.E. 740 (1934) (where the defendant charged with murder
in connection with the jail delivery of the notorious Dillinger was known to the court
to be desperate and dangerous, and where it was common report and evidently possible
that his cohorts might try to rescue defendant during trial, the court did not deprive
him of a public trial when each spectator was required to have a pass signed by either
the judge or the officer in command of soldiers guarding the courthouse. See People v.
Mangiapane, 219 Mich. 62, 188 N.W. 401, 403 (1922) (no error, since the court
discovered, and stopped, a police search outside the courtroom of underworld charac-
ters, of which the jury was still unaware). But cf., Davis v. United States, 247 Fed.
394, 395 (8th Cir. 1917) (though the crowd was noisy, and becoming boisterous, and
could have been excluded to prevent overcrowding, a general exclusion order was
error).
' E.g., United States v. Kobli, supra note 10, at 922 (trial for violation of the Mann
Act; the exclusion of high school girls was permissible -but not of the public gen-
erally) ; State ex rel. Baker v. Utecht, 221 Minn. 145, 21 N.W.2d 328, 331, cert.
denied, 327 U.S. 810 (1946) (Sodomy; persons of "immature years" could be
excluded temporarily) ; E. W. Scripps Co. v. Fulton, 100 Ohio App. 157, 125 N.E.2d
896, 904, appeal dismissed 164 Ohio St. 261, 130 N.E.2d 701 (1955) (pandering;
trial judge not only has the right but the duty to exclude from a trial involving a
morals offense those who by reason of "immaturity," or otherwise, would be harmfully
affected by attending) ; Commonwealth ex rel. Paylor v. Cavell, supra note 10, at 249
(rape, robbery, assault and battery with intent to ravish; a portion of the public may
be excluded where special circumstances warrant, such as "youthful" spectators in a
case involving scandalous or indecent matters).
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of a witness which would interfere with competent testimony on
facts material to the case.
14
The general agreement ends, however, with the "sex" cases, in
which the court seeks to protect public morals, not because of the
tender years of the spectators or witnesses, but simply because of the
indecent, disgusting, or immoral matters to be presented in evidence.
The Supreme Court of Colorado, by adopting the opinion of
United States v. Kobli,'4a now joins those jurisdictions which safe-
guard the right to public trial with permissive rules directed in
favor of general attendance. Kobli forbids the "general indiscrim-
inate" exclusion of the public from a criminal trial and limits
the discretionary exclusion to only those persons or classes whose
particular exclusion is justified. 5 Kobli explicitly recognizes the
"franker more realistic attitude" of today's society toward matters
"4E.g., Geise v. United States, 262 F.2d 151, 156-57 (9th Cir. 1958), reb. denied, 265
F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1959) (rape; exclusion of all except press, bar, and relatives and
close friends of defendant and the nine-year-old prosecutrix and witnesses aged seven
and eleven, in view of difficulty of obtaining testimony from children before a large
audience) ; Kirstowsky v. Superior Court, 143 Cal. App. 2d 745, 300 P.2d 163, 169
(1956) (murder; where the defendant requested exclusion of all, including the press,
and waived right to public trial, the court had the right to do so because of the
witness' emotional disturbance which would have prevented her testifying freely and
completely-but it was error thereafter to make the order effective at beginning of
testimony and continue it throughout trial) ; People v. Byrnes, 84 Cal.App.2d 72, 190
P.2d 290, 294, cert. denied, 335 U.S. 847 (1948) (court noted that what it had said
relative to the exclusion of general public from the trial in the interest of "public
morals" being a deprivation of the right to public trial, did not apply to a situation
in which it would appear to the court that a material witness because of emotional
disturbance would be substantially prevented from giving testimony in the presence of a
crowd of spectators) ; State v. Poindexter, 231 La. 630, 92 So. 2d 390, 391-92 (1956)
(homicide within prison walls; because it refused to exclude prison officials upon
request of defendant who feared for them to hear his testimony concerning death of a
fellow-inmate, the court abused its discretion) ; Commonwealth v. Blondin, 324 Mass.
564, 87 N.E.2d 455, 460 (1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 984 (1950) (rape and abuse
of child; exclusion was correct under statutory authority covering sex cases involving
a minor under 18) ; Commonwealth v. Principatti, 260 Pa. 587, 104 Atd. 53, 57-58
(1918) (murder; error to deny its power to exclude all "Italians" at request of a
defense witness who feared vendetta if they heard his testimony) But see State v.
Hashimoto, 389 P.2d 146, 155 (Hawaii 1963) (rape; it was not error to refuse
defendan't motion to exclude eighteen police recruits who were present in uniform
to observe criminal procedure).
On occasion, the very physical circumstances may force or allow the court correctly
to order evidence presented so that some of the spectators present happen to hear it
and some don't. E.g., Gillars v. United States, 182 F.2d 962, 977-78 (D.C. Cir. 1950)
(treason; evidence by way of recordings was heard by jury and court by individual
earphones, with twenty-three sets of earphones provided for the press and six
spectators) ; Iva Ikuki Toguri D'Aguino v. United States, 192 F.2d 338, 365 (9th Cir.
1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 935 (1952), reb. denied, 345 U.S. 931 (1953) (treason;
evidence presented by recordings, with forty sets of earphones for court, jury and
press) ; People v. Cash, 52 Cal.2d 841, 345 P.2d 462, 466 (1959) (murder; because
of poor acoustics in courtroom, tape-recordings as evidence were played in chambers
in presence of all principals, with no order of exclusion of spectators).
14 172 F.2d 919 (3d Cir. 1949), supra note 1.
' 172 F.2d 919, 923 '(1949).
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of sex, and that such an attitude precludes the exclusion of mature
spectators as well as the immature and impressionable. 6
The theory underlying the Kobli standard of exclusion is that
there is a difference between a trial in which everyone is admitted
except a few and a trial in which everyone is excluded except a few;
the latter is not a public trial. Whether a trial court thinks merely
of public morals, or is convinced that the spectators attend from
prurient or morbid curiosity, it cannot exclude the public generally."
Admission of several classes is nevertheless a denial of a public trial
because of the exclusion of other classes. 8 The exclusion of the press
is usually sufficient to constitute a denial of a public trial, even if
other classes are admitted. 9 Though the court may exclude those of
"Ibid.
"E.g., People v. Byrnes, 84 Cal. App. 2d 72, 190 P.2d 290, 293-94, cert. denied, 335 U.S.
847 (1948) (rape and perversion; general exclusion) ; State v. Keeler, 52 Mont. 205,
156 Pac. 1080, 1081 (1916) (statutory rape; exclusion not only of additional
spectators, but also of those present when once they left the courtroom) ; People v.
Jelke, 308 N.Y. 56, 123 N.E.2d 769, 744, 48 A.L.R.2d 1425, afj'g 284 App. Div. 211,
130 N.Y.S.2d 662 (1948) (compulsory prostitution; exclusion of press and public
only during presentation of people's case).
"E.g., Tanksley v. United States, 145 F.2d 58, 60 (9th Cir. 1944) (rape of a 19-year-
old married woman; only parties, law officers, the press, and brother and father of
the defendant were admitted) ; United States v. Brown, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 251, 22 C.M.R.
41, 47-48 (1956) (obscenity; press, defendant's relatives and anyone else he wanted
admitted) ; People v. Murray, 89 Mich. 276, 286, 50 N.W. 995, 998, 1000 (1891)
(murder; only "respectable" citizens admitted as spectators) ; State v. Haskins, 38 N.J.
Super. 250, 118 A.2d 707, 710 (App. Div. 1955) (lewdness, fornication; lawyers,
witnesses, and press admitted) ; People v. Jelke, supra note 17 (defendant's friends
and relatives admitted during people's case, all others thereafter) ; Neal v. State, 86
Okla. Crim. 283, 192 P.2d 294, 296 (1948) (transporting for purposes for prostitu-
tion; only those actually engaged in the trial admitted). But cf. Lancaster v. United
States, 293 F.2d 519 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (violation of Mann Act and possession of
obscene pictures with intent to exhibit; proper to exclude all except the press when
alleged obscene film was shown in court). See also those cases in which exclusion is
authorized by state statute, e.g., Commonwealth v. Blondin, 324 Mass. 564, 87 N.E.2d
455, 459-60, cert. denied, 339 U.S. 984 (1950) (exclusion under statute in cases of
sex crimes involving a minor under 18) or by state constitution, e.g., Ex parte
Rudolph, 162 So. 2d 486, 487 (Ala. 1964) (exclusion of general public from trial
for rape or assault with intent to ravish.
"E.g., Kirstowsky v. Superior Court, 300 P.2d 163, 169 (Cal. App. 1956) (murder;
the exclusion of the public and press during defendant's testimony because of her
emotional disturbance was within the discretion of the court, but not exclusion from
the very beginning of taking testimony which continued throughout trial; In re Hear-
ings Concerning Canon 35 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, 296 P.2d 465-67 (Colo.
1956) (the constitutional right to a public trial is abridged if the press is excluded) ;
People v. Jelke, 308 N.Y. 56, 123 N.E.2d 123 N.E.2d 769, 774, 48 A.L.R.2d 1425,
ajjg 284 App. Div. 211, 130 N.Y.S.2d 662 (1954) (compulsory prostitution; error
to bar press and public during presentation of people's case) ; E. W. Scripps Co. v.
Fulton, 100 Ohio App. 157, 125 N.E.2d 896, 903-04 (1955), appeal dismissed, 164
Ohio St. 261, 130 N.E.2d 701 (1955) (pandering; exclusion of press and others
except for one witness, on no accepted ground, was error). See Craig v. Harney, 331
U.S. 367, 374-75 (1947) ; Note, 35 MIcH. L. REv. 474, 476 (1937).But cf., State v.
Jackson, 43 N.J. 148, 203 A.2d 1, 9-10 (1964) (dictum) '(murder; in hearing mo-
tions by co-defendants for severance and bail, the trial court could, in order to protect
them from prejudicial publicity, have granted defendants' request for exclusion of
press and public. See Estes v. State, 85 Sup. Ct. 1628, 1632-33 (1965).
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tender years or immature minds,2" they must be that. 1 The right to
a public trial applies to the entire trial," although not to matters
which are by their nature confidential, not intended for consideration
by the jury or spectators,"2 or are simply not a part of the trial. 4
In contrast, some opinions seem to consider a trial public as
long as it is not secret, and allow general exclusion when warranted
by presentation of immoral, disgusting, or indecent matters at trial.2"
The weight of authority holds that denial of a public trial
Supra note 13.
'Reynolds v. State, 126 So. 2d 497, 498 (Ala. App. 1961) (indecent molestation of
child; an order excluding all those under eighteen yeears of age went beyond excluding
children of tender years) ; DeBoor v. State, 182 N.E.2d 250, 254-55 (Ind. 1962)
(murder; it was not error to refuse defendants' motion for exclusion of high school
students, when there was no evidence that they committed misconduct or attempted to
influence jury).
Exclusion of the defendant's friends has been held error. State v. Haskins, 38 N.J.
Super. 250, 118 A.2d 707, 710 (App. Div. 1955) (lewdness, fornication; order
excluding all and intended to exclude defendant's friends is error, and to be noticed
by appellate court though defendant failed to object at the time) ; see Re Oliver, 333
U.S. 257, 271-72 (1947) (the accused is at the very least entitled to have his friends,
relatives, and counsel present). By this authority, the Thompson conviction could have
been reversed on the exclusion of the parties' friends alone. In State v. Holm, 67 Wyo.
360, 224 P.2d 500, 513 (1950), a statutory rape case, the court kept count, and though
it excluded spectators at first, it later modified the order to allow in friends of the
parties, noting 35 to 45 people in the courtroom throughout the trial. No error.
People v. Jelke, supra note 18; Bonicelli v. State, 339 P.2d 1063, 1065-66 (Okla. Crim.
1959) (burglary; error to permit the jury to enter chambers because of courtroom's
noisy air-conditioning system, and, while the door was closed deliberately against all
but court and counsel, to hear tape-recordings of evidence. But cf. People v. Buck, 46
Cal. App. 2d 558, 116 P.2d 160, 162 (1941) (rape; there was no prejudice in ordering
courtroom doors locked during instructions to the jury, to obviate the disturbance of
spectators coming and going, since the court ordered no one to depart and opened
the doors immediately afterward) ; State v. Meyers, 14 Utah 2d 417, 385 P.2d 609, 610
(1963) (rape of own daughter; exclusion of witnesses alone, except prosecutrix,
during opening statement of prosecutor not error) ; State v. Collins, 50 Wash. 2d 740,
314 P.2d 660, 663-65 (1957) (murder; though appellate court does not commend it,
the trial court met the requirement for public trial despite locking the courtroom doors
during state's closing argument so that the jury "wouldn't be disturbed").
'People v. Rodriguez, 338 P.2d 41, 48 (Cal. App. 1959) (narcotics; conferences
between court and counsel at the bench and in chambers do not deny defendant
"public" trial) ; cf. People v. Spencer, 338 P.2d 484, 487 (Cal. App. 1959) (uttering
forgery) ; People v. Teitelbaum, 329 P.2d 157, 171-72 (Cal. App. 1958).
"Hayes v. United States, 296 F.2d 657, 668 (8th Cir. 1961) (kidnapping; conferences
in chamber to decide whether defendant will defend self are pre-trial, not part of trial).
'E.g., Reagan v. United States, 202 Fed. 488, 490 (9th Cir. 1913) (rape of one under
sixteen; no error to exclude spectators when there was no evidence of prejudice to
defendant thereby and he wasn't deprived of the presence, aid, or counsel of any
person who presence might have aided him) ; Keddington v. State, 19 Ariz. 457, 172
Pac. 273, 274 (1918) (contributing to "dependency" of a minor; relatives of de-
fendants and press, which latter class would ensure more of a public trial than "a
housefull of idle and curious courthouse loungers") ; Benedict v. People, 23 Colo. 126,
129, 46 Pac. 637, 638 (1896) ("the infamous crime against nature"; exclusion of all
except bar, officers of the court, law students, and witnesses; State v. Nyhus, 19 N.D.
376, 124 N.W. 71, 72 (1909) (rape of female under fourteen; exclusion of all except
counsel, witnesses, and any other requested by either party).
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necessarily implies prejudice and nothing more need be shown."'
In Thompson v. People, the court rejected the attorney general's
reliance upon the only Colorado precedent, Benedict v. People,"7
distinguishing that case upon its procedural facts on appeal and the
failure of the defendant to object to exclusion of the public. While
it is true that the Colorado court did not explicitly overrule Benedict,
the effect, as contended by Justice McWilliams in his dissent,2s seems
to be exactly that.2 1 In approving United States v. Kobli, the court
has adopted the standard that indiscriminate exclusion of the public
from a criminal trial is denial of a public trial, and such a denial,
ipso facto, warrants an assumption of prejudice to the defendant
which requires reversal.
Benedict v. People was the sole and aged precedent in Colorado
Its propriety and correctness arose from "an earlier and more formally
modest age." That age is past. So, it would seem, is Benedict as
legal precedent in Colorado.
William K. Hickey
'United States v. Kobli, 172 F.2d 919, 921 (3d Cir. 1949) adopting the rule of the
Eighth and Ninth Circuits. Tanksley v. United States, 145 F.2d 58, 59 (9th Cir. 1944)
(rape) ; Davis v. United States, 247 Fed. 394, 398-99 (8th Cir. 1917) (train robbery) ;
People v. Byrnes, 84 Cal. App. 2d 72, 190 P.2d 290, 294, cert. denied, 335 U.S. 847
(1948) (rape and sexual perversion) ; State v. Haskins, 38 N.J. Super. 250, 118 A.2d
707, 710 (1955) (lewdness, fornication; prejudice presumed even with no objection
from defendant) ; People v. Jelke, 308 N.Y. 56, 123 N.E.2d 769, 775, 48 A.L.R.2d
1425, affg 284 App. Div. 211, 130 N.Y.S.2d 662 (1954) (compulsory prostitution) ;
Neal v. State, 86 Okla. Crim. 283, 192 P.2d 294, 296 (1948) (transporting persons
for purpose of prostitution) ; State v. Collins, 50 Wash. 2d 740, 314 P.2d 660, 663
(1957) (murder) ; Contra, Benedict v. People, 23 Colo. 126, 129, 46 Pac. 637, 638
(1896) ("the burden of showing . . . prejudice rests upon the one assigning it . . .
and in the absence of a contrary showing, . . . we are justified in assuming that it [the
exclusion] was made at the request or with the consent of the accused himself .... ) ;
Reagan v. United States, 202 Fed. 488, 490 (9th Cir. 1913) ("[I]t is not reversible
error to exclude the spectators as was done, when there is no showing whatever that
the defendant was prejudiced thereby .. "). But even this pronouncement has been
described as "dictum" in a later opinion by the same court. Tanksley v. United States.
145 F.2d 58, 59 (9th Cir. 1944). And see the reference to Reagan in note 28, infra.
"23 Colo. 126, 46 Pac. 637 (1896).
399 P.2d at 783-84. Justice McWilliams, dissenting in Thompson, preferred the opinion
in Reagan v. United States, 202 Fed. 488 (9th Cir. 1913), which reflected the view of
Benedict that exclusion of those who come from morbid curiosity is not reversible
error so long as the exclusion does not render the trial a secret one, or cause some
prejudice to the defendant by depriving him of some person whose presence might have
been of advantage to him. Note, however, the fact that the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit a generation later distinguished its Reagan opinion when it said in
Tanksley v. United States, 145 F.2d 58, 59 (9th Cir. 1944), "In the Reagan case, this
court did not hold that the exclusion of the public was not a violation of the defendant's
right to a public trial. What was held was that, on the facts existing in that case, no
possible prejudice could have been suffered by the defendant from the exclusion of the
public." Still later, in 1958, the Ninth Circuit again distinguished Reagan, but
declared that it had never overruled or disapproved it, when it approved exclusion of
the public from a rape case involving a nine-year-old prosecutrix. Geise v. United
States, 262 F.2d 151, 156-57 (9th Cir. 1958), reh. denied 265 F.2d 659 (9th Cir.
1959).
399 P.2d at 783.
United States v. Kobli, 172 F.2d at 923 (3rd Cir. 1949).
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Perspectives of Law
Essays for Austin Wakeman Scott
EDITED BY POUND, GRISWOLD AND SUTHERLAND
Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1964. Pp. xx, 386. $10.00
Inspired by Roscoe Pound, this collection of seventeen essays
was written and published as a tribute to Harvard's Austin Wake-
man Scott, a law teacher for more than half a century, and the lead-
ing authority on trusts for longer than most lawyers can remember.
It purports to be a group of essays by Scott's "sometime students"
which seems not quite accurate because one of the essays was written
by Pound.' All essays were written by law teachers.
Sure to catch the attention and re-kindle the memory of Austin
Scott's former students is the collection of photographs and the
Scott letter to Professor Barton Leach appearing in the front of the
book. Harvard law graduates will want the book because the prefa-
tory materials permanently record the warm, giving, and scholarly
Austin Scott. The book will also be cherished by all who revere
Dean Pound because his essay, "The King Can Do No Wrong," is
the last published work of the venerable and respected dean.
Anyone who attempts to read this collection of essays from
cover to cover will find them disconnected and widely diverse in
content and quality. It is perhaps to be expected that few of the
essays approach the precision and lucidity of the man in whose
honor they were published. But it is disappointing to find so many
pedestrian, circumloquacious-and even dull-essays in the volume.
The collection does, however, include some valuable and well-
done works that lawyers, scholars and librarians should know about.
Only a few can be reviewed here.
Master of both legal concepts and communication arts, Profes-
sor Cavers presents a brilliant and important discussion of the prem-
ises upon which a choice of law should be made in considering the
effect to be given to an oral agreement to make a testamentary
disposition, where the agreement is valid in the state where made
but invalid in the state in which legal effect is desired- or con-
versely, where the agreement would be invalid under the laws of the
'The reproduction of a delightful letter from Scott to Professor Leach, among the
introductory materials in the volume, indicates that Scott and Pound were appointed
Assistant Professor and Story Professor respectively on the same day, May 9, 1910.
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state in which the agreement was made, but valid in the state in
which legal effect is sought. Professor Cavers analyzes the two
major considerations in making a choice of law: fairness to the
promisee in light of his reasonable expectation under the circum-
stances, and the scope of the protection of a promisor's estate in-
tended by a state statute. His analysis leads him to a discussion of
the more difficult problems arising when the transaction is so divided
between two states that it is hard to assess the expectations of the
promisee, and when the reasonable expectations of the promisee
point to the law of a state which would defeat the promise.
Perhaps one of the most important essays of our time, done
with his characteristic logic and clarity, is Professor Kenneth Culp
Davis' work on judicial notice. Davis is concerned with making
judicial notice more useful in non-jury cases and in administrative
hearings. He expresses the fear that John T. McNaughton's re-
vision of Wigmore's treatise on evidence will constitute a long step
backward in the sensible use of judicially noticed facts by adopting
the view that judicially noticed facts are not rebuttable. If the
McNaughton view' should prevail, Davis fears that the embryonic
trend toward utilization of the talents of social scientists in resolving
disputes will be retarded - or killed.
The Davis view is that the trier of fact should be permitted to
take judicial notice as a matter of convenience, that most facts not-
ticed are so obviously true (such as that an automobile has four
wheels) that nobody would question them, but that, in the interest
of fairness, any party should be permitted an opportunity to rebut.
Essentially, Davis favors leaving the matter of taking judicial notice
and affording a right to rebut to the instinct for fairness of the
trier of fact, rather than impose a rule under which judicial notice
could be taken only when the fact noticed is so clearly indisputable
as to admit no rebuttal.
In the realm of legal philosophy, the best essay is that of Julius
Stone entitled " 'Result-Orientation' and Appellate Judgment," con-
cerning the proper process for judgment making. He discusses the
problems inherent in the opposed "neutral principles of law" and
the "result orientated" approaches to decision making, and finally
concludes that assurance of good judgments lies not in one process
2 Professor Cavers' essay is entitled "Oral Contracts to Provide by Will and the Choice-
of-Law Process: Some Notes on Bernkrant." His study particularly examines Bern-
krant v. Fowler, 55 Cal. 2d 588, 360 P. 2d 906 (1961); Emery v. Burbank, 163
Mass. 326, 39 N.E. 1026 (1895); and Rubin v. Irving Trust Co., 305 N.Y. 288,
113 N.E. 2d 424 '(1953).
'McNaughton, judicial Notice-Excerpts Relating to the Morgan-Wigmore Con-
troversy, 15 VAND. L. REv. 799 (1961).
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or the other but in the "endowments and trainings of those who
judge."
History and philosophy are sometimes difficult to separate, but
in whichever category the reader wishes to put them, the essays of
Pound on sovereign immunity,4 and of Sutherland on two centuries
of Blackstone" must be mentioned.
Pound traces the historical foundations of sovereign immunity
and points out that "the historical immunity of the sovereign was
becoming intolerable under modern conditions of economic, indus-
trial, and social activity in the complex organization of a free politi-
cal government of today." He indicates why and how the intolera-
bility of the doctrine led to establishment of the Court of Claims
in 18556 and later to the Federal Tort Claims Act.7 He points out
that today persons can sue the United States on matters of express
or implied contract, and on tort liability, but that the private citizen
has no recourse for property taken by the United States, in spite of
the constitutional prohibition against taking private property for a
public use without just compensation.' Then, philosophizing that
"all remnants of the King's immunity should have ended," Pound
calls for enactment of a statute permitting recovery of damages from
the United States for the taking of property needed for public
purposes.
Professor Sutherland's essay on Blackstone is an entertaining
and readable piece that every lawyer should enjoy and that every
law professor should read. In this brief essay, Sutherland incredibly
accomplishes a number of things. He reviews the Commentaries,
he reviews the life of Blackstone, he reflects upon Blackstone's in-
fluence on American law, he admonishes law teachers as to what
they should be doing, and he contributes a literary gem that cannot
fail to quicken the pulse of Austin Wakeman Scott.
In my view, the five essays just discussed are the standouts in
originality and importance. The balance of the seventeen essays
include a number of solid works worthy of publication in a good
journal, including Havighurst's "Reflections on the Executory Ac-
cord," Leach's "Perpetuities: Cy Pres on the March," Rice's "States
as Suitors in Interstate Litigation in the Supreme Court," and the
'Entitled The King Can Do No Wrong.
Entitled Blackstone After Two Centuries.
10 Stat. 612 (1855).
S60 Stat. 842 (1946), 28 U.S.C. § 2671 (1958).
'U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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historical piece by Haskins, "The First American Reform of Civil
Procedure."
It is regrettable that only about half the essays in the volume
suitably reflect the scholarship, precision, and style that Austin
Wakeman Scott must have desired from his students and colleagues.
It is regrettable, too, that they have not appeared in journals covered
by standard indexes. As for the rest,-.
Harold E. Hurst*
*Dean, University of Denver College of Law.
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As you well know, any business question
should be handled by a specialist ... par-
ticularly a question on business insurance.
For example: if you need a partnership plan,
or if you're working with estates, we can pro-
vide insurance counsel, and help you work
out the most suitable program for your needs.
Think about it. You may want to get in touch
with us.
The Colorado Agency
210 Clayton Street Phone: 388-5911
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